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INTRODUCTION
Jose and Kitty sat on the couch with their backs to the door, watching tele-
vision. Suddenly, the door burst open and a series of shotgun blasts were fired,
the rapid sequence sounding like a sting of firecrackers exploding. Moments later,
the room was silent. Jose was dead on the couch, having suffered numerous shots
to his body, including a wound to the back of his head. His wife Kitty was also
dead. She was lying on the floor with several wounds, including a frontal shotgun
blast which had removed a portion of her head.!
Who committed these heinous acts? Lyle and Erik Menendez, the victims'
adult sons, confessed to the two slayings and were subsequently charged with two
counts each of first degree murder.2 The brothers claimed that they killed their
parents in self-defense.3 The specific theory they presented was an imperfect
theory of self-defense4 referred to as the battered child defense. 5A theory of self-
1. See John Johnson & Ronald L. Soble, The Brothers Menendez, L.A. TIMES MAG., July 22, 1990,
at 6 (describing the details of the murders of Jose and Kitty Menendez).
2. Id.
3. Gale Holland, An Arresting Trial; TV Transforms the Menendez Brothers Into Star Witnesses,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 2, 1994, at 7; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 197(3) (West 1988) (defining self-defense as the
authorized use of deadly force against another who poses an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury
when there are no other reasonable alternatives); CALJIC 5.13 (providing the California jury instruction for
justifiable homicide as a lawful defense of self or another); BAI 7.55 (1992) (stating the jury instruction for
self-defense, or the defense of others); MELROY B. HUTNICK, CRIMINAL LAW AND COURT PROCEDURES 60
(1974) (defining self-defense as a theory which permits a person to take a human life and not be held criminally
responsible for the act). A person may use deadly force in order to defend against death or great bodily harm.
Id.; see also John N. Scobey, Self-Defense Parricide: Expert Psychiatric Testimony on the Battered Child
Syndrome, 13 HAMuINE L. REV. 181, 181 (1992) (noting that in a parricide, self-defense is the primary
motivation for children's actions); infra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of the
Menendez brothers' defense); cf. Anne Burke, Menendez Jurors Recount Gender War in Jury Room; Women
on Panel Say Men Pushed Murder Conviction, S.F. EXAMINR, Jan. 30, 1994, at A2 (quoting Erik Menendez
juror Hazel Thornton as saying the killings were not pure self-defense).
4. See People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 674, 603 P.2d 1, 4, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 87 (1979) (defining
imperfect self-defense as the honest but unreasonable belief that force is necessary to defend against death or
great bodily harm); infra notes 96-118, 312-317 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of imperfect
self-defense); infra notes 194-223, 318-323 and accompanying text (discussing imperfect self-defense as it
pertains to battered children).
5. George J. Church, Sons and Murderers, TIE, Oct. 4,1993, at 68; see Alan Abrahamson, Menendez
Hearing Revives Some Fascination With Case, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at B3 (reporting that the brothers
testified during their original trials that they had lashed out in self-defense after years of physical, mental, and
sexual abuse); Erik Menendez Retrial to Put StarAttorney Back in Spotlight, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1994, at C12
(explaining that the defendant's testimony was based on an emotioial and tearful defense claiming that he
suffered from sexual molestation); see also infra note 198 and accompanying text (classifying the battered child
defense as an imperfect self-defense). Other types of imperfect self-defenses include the battered woman
defense because the focus is on the subjective fear of the female defendant. Other examples of situations in
which an abused person has used a theory of imperfect self-defense include battered men who kill their abusers,
battered women who kill their female partners, and battered roommates. Lenore E. A. Walker, Battered Women
Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 321,321 (1992); see infra notes 190-
191 and accompanying text (discussing other situations to which evidence of the state of mind of a battered
defendant has been considered).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 26
defense is deemed imperfect if the person had an honest but unreasonable belief
of imminent danger.6 Relying on this theory, the brothers argued that their actions
were justified because having previously been abused by their parents, they
believed their parents' behavior that evening indicated that their parents intended
to kill them!
The battered child defense has been used by some abused children who
reacted to their abusers by becoming violent and killing them.8 The defense stems
from the child's fear of the parent as a result of years of physical, sexual, and
emotional abuse which causes the child to interpret an act by the parent as a
threat, whereas, an outsider would not.9 Several states have considered the testi-
mony of expert witnesses regarding the effects of abuse on the child's honest and
reasonable fear of imminent danger and have ultimately reached different con-
clusions.10 The Menendez trial has been the most publicized case in California to
provide a jury with the opportunity to consider the history of a child's abuse when
assessing his level of culpability.1"
In January of 1994, the Menendez brothers' murder trial ended in a mistrial
for each defendant.'2 These inconclusive decisions did not resolve whether Cali-
fornia would accept or reject the admissibility of evidence of the child's abuse.
The outcomes also prompted Los Angeles County District Attorney Gil Garcetti
to announce that the brothers would be retried for the first degree murders.' 3 The
6. See infra notes 96-118,312-323 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of imperfect self-
defense); infra note 309 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of perfect self-defense).
7. See infra notes 305-317 and accompanying text (discussing the brothers' allegations of abuse by
their parents); cf. State v. Cruickshank, 484 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1985) (finding that the fact that the defendant
teenager had been sexually abused by her father was sufficient to mitigate her crime because the court
determined that her action arose out of fear of further abuse).
8. See infra notes 194-223, 318-323 and accompanying text (discussing the admissibility of the state
of mind of a battered child defendant); infra notes 228-86 and accompanying text (discussing specific cases
in which children have attempted to present evidence of their state of mind at the time of the killing); see also
Nancy Blodgett, Self-Defense: Parricide Defendants Cite Sexual Abuse as Justification, A.B.A. J., June 1,
1987, at 37 (reporting that over 90% of the children who kill their parents have been physically, emotionally,
or sexually abused).
9. Church, supra note 5, at 68.
10. See infra notes 228-286 and accompanying text (discussing the admissibility of evidence in other
jurisdictions of a battered child defendant's state of mind).
11. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text, infra notes 302-317 and accompanying text (discussing
the Menendez case). The brothers' trial took place in the same courtroom with two different juries. The theory
supporting this procedure was that the same or similar evidence would be offered against each defendant and
it would be more efficient to try the defendants together. There were occasions in which one jury would be
excused because evidence was not relevant to a particular defendant. In addition, the brothers had separate
teams of defense counsel who argued solely for their client. Lois Romano, The Reliable Source, VASH. POST,
Jan. 24, 1995, at E3.
12. See Romano, supra note 11, at E3 (reporting that Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Stanley
Weisberg set June 12, 1995, as the date for the retrial of the Menendez brothers). One year ago, in the original
trial, the brothers were tried as codefendants before two separate juries which deadlocked on murder and man-
slaughter charges. Id.
13. RON SOBLE &JOHN JOHNSON, BLOOD BROTHERS 391 (1994).
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brothers will likely be permitted to use the same theory of defense during the
second trial.1 4 This certainty stems from the 1994 California Supreme Court
decision affirming In re Christian,5 a case in which the merits of imperfect self-
defense were at issue.' 6 Because the supreme court upheld the concept of
imperfect self-defense, defendants can continue to present evidence of prior abuse
in order to show their fear was well-grounded.
The battered child defense is the most recent theory of imperfect self-defense
defense to evolve.' 7 It is similar to the battered woman defense, in which the jury
is allowed to consider the defendant's subjective state of mind at the time of the
killing in order to determine the reasonableness of her conduct. 18 The number of
instances in which abusive parents are killed by their children does not presently
comprise a significant percentage of total homicides. 9 However, due to the
growing public awareness of child abuse, it seems possible to infer that parricides
may become more common, which may impact the criminal justice system, the
social service system, and the children themselves.
The purpose of this Comment is to explore the reasoning behind the
admissibility of evidence of a battered child defendant's state of mind at the time
of the killing and to determine the impact that this theory of imperfect self-
defense might have on the California criminal justice system. Part I explores the
origin and rationale underlying justification defenses.20 Part II describes the
theory of imperfect self-defense. 2' Part I discusses the admissibility of state of
14. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing the California Supreme Court's recent
consideration of imperfect self-defense); infra notes 287-352 and accompanying text (anticipating the
admissibility of evidence of a battered child defendant's state of mind to negate the element of malice in
murder).
15. 7 Cal. 4th 768, 872 P.2d 574,30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33 (1994).
16. Christian, 7 Cal. 4th at 771,872 P.2d at 575,30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34; see id. (upholding the theory
of imperfect self-defense by articulating that it arises from a rational need which, absent being terrorized, the
defendant would not have felt).
17. Scobey, supra note 3, at 182.
18. Id.; see State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495, 503 (Wash. 1993) (determining that sufficient scientific
evidence exists to justify admitting evidence regarding the battered woman syndrome to analogous situations
affecting children); Jamie H. Sacks, Comment, A New Age of Understanding: Allowing Self-Defense Claims
For Battered Children Who Kill TheirAbusers, 10 J. CON'rEmP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 349,352 (1994) (arguing
that it is logical to extend the recognized self-defense claim for women who kill their batterers to children who
kill their abusers); id. (noting that the psychological effects upon battered children mirror those of battered
women and the self-defense claims of each are similar); infra notes 127-191 and accompanying text (discussing
the evolution of the battered woman's defense).
19. See PAUL MONES, WHEN A CHILD KILLs 7 (1991) (citing FBI statistics documenting an average of
350 parricide cases annually in the United States between 1976-1990); Blodgett, supra note 8, at 37 (stating
that about 400 homicides each year result from children killing their parents or hiring another to do the same);
see also MONEs, at 27 (1991) (noting that parricide is the rarest form of intrafamily murder, except for the less
frequent incidents of brothers killing sisters); Mark Thompson, Battered Child Syndrome Gets No Respect,
L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 26, 1985, at 3 (indicating that in the majority of the parricide cases in 1982, the child had
suffered a long period of abuse by the parent).
20. See infra notes 26-95 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 26
mind evidence in cases of battered woman defendants.Y Part IV focuses on other
states' treatment of evidence regarding a battered child defendant's state of
mind.2 Part V contemplates the California courts' consideration of admitting
such evidence in light of the state's current treatment of state of mind evidence
in cases with battered woman defendants. 24 Additionally, this Comment addresses
the California Supreme Court's recent decision to uphold the concept of imperfect
self-defense, and considers ramifications that may result from admitting evidence
regarding a battered child's state of mind.
I. THE JUSTIFICATION AND HISTORY OF SELF-DEFENSE
Self-defense originated to protect those who were forced to kill an aggressor
in order to save their own lives.26 Although the theory of self-defense evolved
under the common law and, eventually, the Model Penal Code, its basic elements
have remained constant 7 Thus, in order to understand the evolution of self-
defense, it is first necessary to review the common law.
A. Common Law
Common law self-defense arose as a defense to justify the use of deadly force
to protect one's home or property from another.?" In order for a person to assert
22. See infra notes 121-193 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 194-284 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 285-352 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 324-352 and accompanying text.
26. See State v. Sloan, 47 Mo. 604,610 (1871) (setting forth the common law rule of self-defense which
permits a person to kill an assailant if the person reasonably believes that the assailant is about to cause death
or great bodily harm to his person); see also JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PROCESS
958 (1974) (describing the act of self-defense as one person intentionally killing another in order to further the
community objective of preventing unlawful death or great bodily injury to one's person); Phyllis L. Crocker,
The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 121, 123
(1985) (explaining that traditional self-defense laws were promulgated to allow a person who was unlawfully
attacked by another and who lacked time to seek assistance from the legal system to take reasonable steps to
defend his life).
27. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text (comparing the common law theory of self-defense
to the Model Penal Code's provision for justification defenses).
28. Thompson v. State, 55 Ga. 47, 50 (1875); see Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379, 382 (Wyo. 1979)
(providing that self-defense justifies a homicide under circumstances in which a reasonable person deems it
necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm); Thompson, 55 Ga. at 50 (defining justifiable homicide as the
killing of another in self-defense or in defense of habitat, person, or property); see also JEROME HALL,
GENERAL PRINCILES OFCRIMINAL LAW 415 (2d ed. 1960) (stating that common law criminal provisions were
developed on the premise that it is generally possible for people to control their conduct so as to not inflict
serious bodily harm upon others). Hall notes, however, that common law self-defense provisions also
recognized that the infliction of serious harm is sometimes justifiable. Id. The early common law required three
conditions forjustifiable self-defense: (1) The actor must have inflicted the harm under pressure; (2) the force
must have been of equal value to that which was threatened; (3) the harm must have been the only alternative
available. Id. at 426. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 198.5 (West 1988) (setting forth a recent example of
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self-defense under the common law, three elements generally must be proven.29
First, the person must have a reasonable fear of an apparent danger that an
aggressor is going to inflict death or great bodily harm upon him.3" Second, the
person must have no reasonable means of escape and deadly force must be the
only option available for self-protection. 3' Third, the amount of force used by the
intended victim must be proportional to the magnitude of the harm feared from
the aggressor.32 These common law elements survive in the modem approach to
self-defense.33
Depending on the jurisdiction, however, additional requirements may exist.
For example, some jurisdictions deny the defense to individuals who provoked
their aggressor.' Another common requirement is that the intended victim not
have been the aggressor or in good faith have declined further combat, and that
the intended victim also felt that a use of force was necessary 5 In most juris-
a statute which provides for the defense of one's home). The Home Protection Bill of Rights provides the
presumption that any person who uses deadly force in the protection of his home against another who had
forcibly entered the home held a reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury to himself or a member of his
family. Id.
29. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7 (2d ed. 1987).
30. LAFAVE & SCoitr, supra note 29, at § 5.7; see also Leeper, 589 P.2d at 382 (specifying that the
traditional self-defense justification requires that the defendant have a reasonable fear of death or great bodily
harm); Kirby v. State, 8 So. 110, 111 (Ala. 1889) (emphasizing that in addition to preventing death, a person
may use self-defense to prevent great bodily harm).
31. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 29, at §§ 5.7, 5.7(a); see Shorter v. People, 2 N.Y. 193, 201 (1849)
(providing that the defendant must have believed that deadly force was necessary and that a reasonable person
in the same or similar circumstances would have reacted the same way). But see State v. West, 12 So. 7, 9 (La.
1893) (stating that as a general rule, one who is assaulted by another with a dangerous weapon is not justified
in taking the assailant's life).
32. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 29, at § 5.7(b); see People v. Shimonaka, 16 Cal. App. 117, 124, 116
P. 327, 330 (1911) (ruling that a person who is assaulted is justified in using as much force as necessary in
response, although if he is faced with a negligible assault, he may not use any measure of great violence);
Trogdon v. State, 32 N.E. 725, 726-27 (Ind. 1892) (articulating that a person may only use as much force as
is necessary to protect himself); MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.04 cmt. 4(a) (1985) [hereinafter
COMMENTARIES] (discussing the common law principle that the force used must bear a reasonable relation to
the force evaded); ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 691 (5th ed.
1977) (providing that a person may use such force as appears reasonably necessary to defend against an
apparent threat of harm from another).
33. See LAFAVE & ScOT, supra note 29, at § 5.7 (stating that modem laws allow an intended victim
to use force in order to defend himself when he is assaulted by another and has no other lawful alternative).
34. See Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379, 383 (Wyo. 1979) (explaining that under the traditional self-
defense doctrine, a person was not justified in claiming self-defense if he had initiated the attack); Bain v. State,
70 Ala. 4, 7 (1881) (specifying that the defendant must neither have provoked nor encouraged the situation,
and must at the time have been so threatened as to create a reasonable apprehension of loss of life or grievous
bodily harm, without other means of escape). But see Commonwealth v. Shurlock, 14 Leg. Int. 33 (Pa. 1857)
(maintaining that, in the eyes of the law, no kind of provocation justifies or excuses the taking of human life).
35. Heard v. State, 70 Ga. 597,600 (1883); see Grainger v. State, 13 Tenn. 458,462 (1830) (indicating
that a person who senses the threat of imminent great bodily harm from another is justified in killing out of fear
or cowardice); cf. State v. Wilson, 62 A. 227, 231 (Del. 1904) (establishing that when a person is assaulted,
he is not obliged to wait until he is struck by an impending blow before responding to the assault; but he is not
justified in using more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances).
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dictions, however, it will not matter if the intended victim harbored adverse
feelings toward the aggressor, so long as the intended victim's primary moti-
vation for killing the aggressor was fear.36
The common law jurisdictions also vary in the amount of discretion given
juries in evaluating the imminence of the danger; but they are generally in agree-
ment that it is a function for the trier of fact to determine whether there was actual
danger at the time of the killing?' According to this view, the intended victim
need not wait until an armed assailant actually makes an attack before defending
himself.38 For example, some courts instruct the jury that if a threat of death or
great bodily harm exists, the intended victim may protect himself before the
assailant comes within striking distance.39 Other courts, however, require not only
that the danger be present, but that it exists at the instant that self-defense is
used.4°
36. See Cannon v. State, 57 Miss. 147, 154 (1879) (clarifying that a person's animosity towards another
does not deny him the right to kill that other in self-defense); Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527, 532 (1858)
(validating a claim of self-defense even if the defendant had expressed malice toward the deceased); see also
Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248, 266 (1874) (requiring that the danger be imminent and sufficiently urgent as
to render the killing necessary). In essence, the motive behind the actions of the accused must be fear, as might
be entertained by a reasonable person, not revenge. Id.
37. See People v. Williams, 205 N.E.2d 749,752-53 (111. App. 1965) (specifying that the trier of fact
must consider whether an imminent threat is posed and whether the aggressor is willing and able to injure the
defendant); People v. Taylor, 4 Cal. App. 31, 37, 87 P. 215, 218 (1906) (stating that in order to justify a killing
as self-defense, the danger must have existed at the very time the defendant killed the deceased); State v. Rose,
1 P. 817, 820-21 (Kan. 1883) (approving the propriety of ajury instruction which provides that no one can kill
another because he may fear injury at some future time); Palmore, 29 Ark. at 266 (holding that the defendant
must act under the influence of such fears as would a reasonable person); Dupree v. State, 33 Ala. 380, 389
(1859) (ruling that mere fear, though well-grounded, is not a justification for personal violence unless the
danger appears to be imminent or threatening); Dyson v. State, 26 Miss. (4 Cushm.) 362, 386-87 (1853)
(dictating that the bare fear of danger or great bodily harm, unaccompanied by any overt act indicating a
present intention to injure or kill, does not warrant a killing in self-defense); cf. infra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text (discussing immediacy under the Model Penal Code).
38. See Goodall v. State, I Or. 333, 337 (1861) (commenting that if there is a reasonable ground for
the defendant to believe he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, it is not necessary that the
defendant wait until an assault is actually committed); see also Fortenberry v. State, 55 Miss. 403, 408-09
(1877) (recognizing that the actual harm might precede or follow the defensive act by a short interval of time).
But see People v. Scoggins, 37 Cal. 676, 683 (1869) (noting previous threats alone do not justify a deadly
assault).
39. See, e.g., Goodall, I Or. at 337 (instructing the jury that if the defendant's reaction reveals that he
subjectively feared for his life, the defendant would not have to wait until he was attacked before defending
himself). Butsee People v. Lynch, 101 Cal. 229,231, 35 P. 860,861 (1894) (providing that the danger present
must be that which a reasonable person would find life threatening).
40. See People v. Williams, 205 N.E.2d 749, 753 (Ill. 1965) (judging the defendant's use of deadly
force to bejustified because the defendant thought the aggressor's harm was going to be inflicted immediately);
State v. Smith, 71 P. 973, 976 (Or. 1903) (stating that a homicide could not be justified as self-defense unless
the accused was in imminent danger of another and the killing was done to prevent the apparent commission
of a felony by the other upon the accused); State v. Hollis, I Houst. Cr. Cas. 24, 27 (Del. 1858) (remarking that
neither fear nor apprehension of death or great bodily harm totally excuses one person for killing another; the
danger must be imminent and real).
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The required degree of reasonableness of the intended victim's apprehension
is another issue on which the common law courts differ. Most of the courts agree
that the danger must have a strong foundation and be honestly entertained. 41 The
courts, however, differ in their determination of the reasonableness of the fear.42
There are four basic approaches that courts take with respect to the amount
of the defendant's subjective fear that a jury may consider when assessing the rea-
sonableness of the defendant's fear. Some courts comline an objective test and
a subjective test to evaluate the perceived danger.43 These courts require that in
order to justify self-defense, the person must have had a subjective belief that
there was a danger of death or great bodily injury, and the circumstances must
have been such that a reasonable person in the same situation would have thought
it necessary to use deadly force4 A second group of courts use an objective test
which evaluates only whether a reasonable person would have felt it necessary to
use deadly force.4 5 These courts reason that killing in self-defense is justifiable
as long as a person experienced some apprehension of harm and there are reason-
able grounds for believing that the danger exists.6 Courts following the third
approach emphasize the defendant's actual belief of fear.47 These courts consider
homicide justifiable only when the defendant actually believed that he was faced
with imminent danger, regardless of whether a reasonable person in the same
situation would have had the same belief.!' The last group of courts further nar
41. See, e.g., People v. Piper, 71 N.W. 174, 175 (Mich. 1897) (finding that the defendant must have
an honest belief that his life is in danger); Jackson v. State, 78 Ala. 471,473 (1885) (deeming it imperative that
the defendant honestly and reasonably believe that killing his assailant is a necessity); see also People v.
Hurley, 8 Cal. 390, 391 (1857) (stating that the defendant must have a reasonable impression that homicide
is necessary to defend his life).
42. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (describing four theories adopted by courts to
determine the level of reasonableness of a defendant's fear).
43. See, e.g., People v. DeWitt, 68 Cal. 584,587, 10 P. 212,213-14 (1886) (maintaining that the danger
must appear to the comprehension of a reasonable person in a similar situation to be imminent, and based on
the danger, a defense must be necessary).
44. See, e.g., Palmore v. State, 29 Ark. 248,266 (1874) (ruling that the defendant must act under the
influence of such fears as would a reasonable person); Shorter v. People, 2 N.Y. 193, 201-02 (1849) (providing
that the defendant may only use the force that a reasonable person would use in the same situation).
45. See, e.g., People v. Kennedy, 54 N.E. 51, 52 (N.Y. 1899) (holding that the defendant must show
reasonable grounds forjustifying his use of self-defense); State v. Warren, 41 A. 190, 191 (Del. 0 & T 1893)
(holding that the fear must be that of an ordinary prudent man under similar circumstances).
46. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 205 N.E.2d 749, 753 (I1. App. 1965) (emphasizing that the belief of
danger may be reasonable even if the defendant is mistaken).
47. See, e.g., Goodall v. State, I Or. 333, 337 (1861) (instructing the jury that if the defendant's reaction
revealed that he subjectively feared for his life, the defendant was not required to wait until he was attacked
before defending himself).
48. See Walker v. State, 23 S.E. 992, 992 (Ga. 1895) (explaining that even if the conduct of the
deceased would have made a reasonable man believe that his life was in danger, the defendant may not claim
justifiable homicide unless the defendant himself felt such fear); see, e.g., People v. Gonzales, 71 Cal. 569,
576, 12 P. 783, 786 (1887) (providing that to render a homicide justifiable on grounds of self-defense, the
defendant must not only be in apparently imminent danger, but he must believe that he is in that perilous
situation); Munday v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. Rep. 233, 239 (1883) (stating that the defendant must actually
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rows the scope of self-defense by requiring that the defendant's act was motivated
by fear of the situation at the time, and for no other reason.4 9 Because of the dis-
crepancies between jurisdictions and in order to achieve greater consistency, the
American Law Institute (ALI) drafted a penal code intended to serve as a model
code for the states.5
B. The Model Penal Code
The inconsistency of common law criminal provisions prompted the ALI to
draft the Model Penal Code (MPC) in order to promote uniformity in different
jurisdictions. Within the MPC, the drafters included definitions and provisions for
numerous crimes, punishments, and justifications.5' The MPC has had a signi-
ficant impact on the states; within the first twenty-two years of the MPC's
existence, twenty-four states revised their penal codes.52 All of these revisions
believe that his life is in danger, but he need not have more than reasonable grounds on which to base his
opinion); Batten v. State, 80 Ind. 394, 404 (1881) (specifying that the right to claim self-defense is not
dependent upon the interpretation that a man of ordinary prudence would have under the same circumstances,
but on the defendant's understanding of the situation).
49. See, e.g., People v. Adams, 85 Cal. 231,235,24 P. 629,631 (1890) (asserting that when a defendant
attempts to justify a killing through self-defense, the proper jury instruction includes the directive that the
defendant should have acted s~lely out of fear of the situation).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see COMMENTARIES § 3.04 cmt. l(b)
(remarking that the Model Penal Code takes a consistent approach in evaluating the actor's belief in necessity
for the use of force); see also Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grail, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 683 (1983) (explaining that American
criminal law has advanced significantly towards greater precision, clarity, and rationality primarily due to the
Model Penal Code); infra notes 51-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Model Penal Code).
51. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1-251.4 (1985) (discussing crimes such as homicide, assault,
kidnapping, sexual offenses, arson, theft, and bribery); id. §§ 301.1-306.6 (1985) (discussing punishments such
as probation, fines, imprisonment, and loss of rights); id. §§ 3.01-3.10 (1985) (discussing principles of
justifications).
52. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-2-2 to 13A-2-4 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.600, 11.81.610,11,81.900(a)
(1989 & Supp. 1994); ARm REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202 (1989 & West Supp. 1994); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-2-
202 to 5-2-204 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-501, 18-1-503 (1986 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-3(1 I), (14), 53a-5 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 231,251-253 (1987 & Supp. 1994);
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 702-204, 702-206 to 702-208, 702-212 to 702-213 (1985 & Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 720 para. 5/3-9 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 501.010 to 501.050 (1995); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, 99 34-35 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 562.016,562.021, 562.026 (Vernon
1979 & Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2-101(33), (37), (58), 45-2-103 to 45-2-104 (1993); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 626:2 (1986 & Supp. 1994); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2 (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
15.00(6), 15.05-15.15 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02 (1985); Onto REV. CODE ANN. §§
2901.21-2901.22 (Page 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.085, 161.115 (1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 302,
305 (Purdon 1983); TENN. CODEANN. §§ 39-11-301, 39-11-302 (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.02- 6.03
(West 1994); UTAH CODEANN. §§ 76-2-101 to 76-2-104 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010
(West 1988); see Robinson & Grail, supra note 50, at 685 (observing that the Model Penal Code has been
overwhelmingly adopted by the states). See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
§ 3.03 (1992) (discussing the Model Penal Code).
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closely parallel the MpC. 3
Self-defense is one of the issues addressed by the MPC.' In drafting the self-
defense provision, the ALI had three aims: (1) To create a systematic and con-
sistent approach to analyzing the appropriateness of the use of force; (2) to co-
ordinate the standards used to evaluate the culpability of an actor using self-
defense with the standards governing another actor with a similar level of culp-
ability; and (3) to specify in detail the circumstances in which acts of force and
of deadly force would be justified 55 This effort culminated in a self-defense pro-
vision which provides that the use of force upon another person is justified when
the defendant believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself
against the use of unlawful force by another person. 6
Under the MPC, the need for using defensive action must be immediate, and
although the threat of unlawful force does not have to be immediate, it must be
anticipated to occur on that occasion: 7 The MPC provision is broader than its
53. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 374 n.8 (NJ. 1984). Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4
(XVest Supp. 1994) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985).
54. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985) (setting forth the provision for Use of Force in Self-
Protection (self-defense)). The provision states in pertinent part:
[Tihe use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such
force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful
force by such other person on the present occasion.
Id.; see also Kelly, 478 A.2d, at 374 n.8 (elaborating that the purpose of Model Penal Code § 3.04 is to prevent
one who killed with an honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity of murder from being convicted of a
crime with such a high scienter requirement). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, 10 U.L.A. 478 (1974
& Supp. 1994) (providing case law interpreting the self-defense provision of the Model Penal Code from those
jurisdictions which have adopted it).
55. COhmENTARiES § 3.04 cmt 1.
56. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985); see COMMENTARIEs § 3.04 explanatory note (1985)
(proposing that the actor's actual belief is sufficient to support the defense, even if he is mistaken); id. § 3.04
cmt. 2(a) (emphasizing that even if a defendant is mistaken as to the degree of force necessary to subdue an
assailant, the defendant may still use the defense to decrease the level of his culpability). The terms "necessary"
and "serious bodily injury" in Model Penal Code § 3.04(1) are ambiguous, but other provisions in the section
help to justify this ambiguity by providing flexibility in unforeseen circumstances. COMMENTARIES § 3.04 cmt.
1. Without this flexibility, people may be discouraged from using force to defend themselves when they feel
emotionally compelled, but they fear that such use is unlawful. Id. It is not necessary that the force from which
the defendant protects himself actually be unlawful; it is enough that the defendant believes that it is. Id. § 3.04
cmt. 2(d); see also David A. Posner, The Proper Standard for Self-Defense in New York.: Should People v.
Goetz Be Viewed as Judicial Legislation or Judicial Restraint?, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 845, 914-15 (1988)
(noting that the Model Penal Code standard for evaluating a defendant's use of self-defense is purely
subjective).
57. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985) (remarking that "force... is justifiable when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary"); COMMENTARIES § 3.04(1)(c) (providing that this section
does not limit the self-defense privilege to danger that is imminent). Distinguish Crocker, supra note 26, at 125
(explaining that "imminent" was traditionally interpreted to mean "immediately")fromn State v. Janes, 850 P.2d
495, 506 (Wash. 1993) (underscoring the differences between the concepts of imminent harm and immediate
harm).
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common law counterpart which requires that the danger be impending or
imminent.58
The MPC also imposes restrictions on the use of self-defense.59 One such
limitation proscribes the use of force to resist arrest Another restriction pro-
hibits the use of force against one who is lawfully protecting or claiming property
under certain circumstances.
61
A third restriction limits the situations in which an actor may use deadly
force.62 Such instances include situations where the actor feels it is necessary to
protect himself from death, serious bodily injury, lddnapping, or rape;63 where the
58. COMMENTARIES §§ 3.04(l)(c), 3.04 cmt. (2)(c) (1985); see B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us Part:
A Comparative Law Approach Justifying Lethal Self-Defense by Battered Women, 1991 DuKE J. CoMP. &
INT'L L. 169, 172 (explaining that immediately necessary is broader than imminent). For examples of state
statutes which use language that is substantially similar to the Model Penal Code, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-
601 (Michie 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 464 (1982); HAw. REV. STAT. § 703-304 (1985); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-1409 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35 (McKinney
1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (1983). For examples of state statutes which use vague language that
is consistent with the Model Penal Code, see ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-404 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
11-611 (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31 (Vernon 1974). Cf. supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text
(discussing imminence under the common law). See generally State v. Huett, 104 S.W.2d 252 (Mo. 1937);
People v. Giacalone, 217 N.W. 758 (Mich. 1928); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (6th ed. 1990) (defining
immediate danger as an inexorable circumstance or situation with the reasonable probability of danger); id.
(defining imminent danger as one which must be instantly met, or as an impending injury that would put a
reasonable and prudent man to his instant defense).
59. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2) (1985) (setting forth the limitations).
60. Id. §§ 3.04(2)(a)(I) (1985); see COMMENTARIES § 3.04 explanatory note (1985) (providing that self-
protection is not justified during any arrest when the actor knows that the arrest is being made by a peace
officer). The arrest may be lawful or unlawful. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(I) (1985); COMMENTARIES
§ 3.04 explanatory note (1985). See also id. § 3.04 cmt. 3(a) (1985) (remarking that in the interest of public
policy, there should be other remedies against unlawful arrest without allowing the arrested person to use a
form of self-protection). See generally id.§ 3.04 cmt. 3(b) (1985) (stating that in the interest of public policy,
it is beneficial to reduce the situations in which there may be conflicting claims to use force).
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(ii) (1985); see COMMENTARIES § 3.04 explanatory note (1985)
(specifying that section 3.04(2)(a)(ii) does not apply when the actor is a public officer acting in the
performance of employment to regain the property; when the actor has been unlawfully dispossessed of his
property; or when the actor believes that use of force is necessary to protect himself against death or great
bodily injury while trying to regain property). See generally COMMENTARIES § 3.04 cmt. 3(b) (1985) (stating
that in the interest of public policy, it is beneficial to reduce the situations in which there may be conflicting
claims to use force).
62. MODEL PENALCODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1985). See generally COMMENTARIES § 3.04 cmt. 3(b) (1985)
(stating that in the interest of public policy, it is beneficial to reduce the situations in which there may be
conflicting claims to use force).
63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1985); see COMMENTARIES § 3.04 explanatory note (1985)
(providing that deadly force is not justified unless the actor believes that such force is essential).
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actor did not provoke the use of force;' or where there are no alternative means
by which to avoid the use of force.65
The MPC addresses two significant consequences which would result from
requiring an intended victim to have objectively reasonabl e grounds for his belief
that the degree of force used was appropriate.6 One is the possibility that the
actor may have a mistaken belief in the degree of force which may be legally
justified. 7 The other consequence is that the intended victim's fear of negligence
in his mistaken belief of the appropriate use of force may prevent him from using
any form of defensive self-protection at all, possibly further endangering his
life.6
Since twenty-four states have adopted the MPC, while twenty-six states still
follow the common law, a discussion of the differences between the MPC and the
common law is necessary.
C. Comparing the Common Law and Model Penal Code
The MPC was drafted primarily to reduce inconsistencies among state
statutory codes.69 There are two significant differences between self-defense pro-
visions under the common law and the MPC. An initial difference is that the MPC
requires the use of force to be immediately necessary; whereas, the danger does
not have to be imminent as is required under the common law.'
Another difference between the MPC and the common law can be found in
the criteria used to determine whether the use of self-defense is necessary in a
particular situation.7 Some states combine an objective test with a subjective test
to determine the appropriate degree of force needed.72 This requires not only that
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(I) (1985); see COMMENTARIES § 3.04 explanatory note (1985)
(stating that deadly force is not justified if the actor provoked the use of force with the intention of causing
death or great bodily injury).
65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii) (1985); see COMMENTARIES § 3.04 explanatory note (1985)
(maintaining that deadly force is not justified if the actor could have taken an alternative course of action). The
Model Penal Code requires that the actor attempt to retreat, surrender possession of the item to which the
aggressor asserts a claim, or comply with the aggressor's demand to abstain from an action that the actor has
no duty to take. Id.
66. CoMMENTARES § 3.04 cmt. 2(a) (1985).
67. See id. (anticipating situations where there may be uncertainty surrounding the degree of force that
a defendant may use and still be acquitted).
68. See id. (cautioning that this error may permit the defendant to be convicted of a greater offense,
including murder). The ALI adopts the opinion that this second consequence is undesired. Id.; cf. State v.
Bongard, 51 S.W.2d 84, 89 (Mo. 1932) (holding that actual violence must occur before use of force is
permitted).
69. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistencies).
70. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discussing the approach of the Model Penal Code);
see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (discussing the approach of the common law).
71. See COMMENTARIES § 3.04 cmt. 2(a) (1985) (discussing the debate on this issue).
72. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text (discussing the objective and subjective tests).
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the defendant subjectively believe that the surrounding circumstances necessitate
the use of a reasonable protective force, but that there also be objectively reason-
able facts to support the belief?3
California is one of the states which has ostensibly rejected the MPC by con-
tinuing to use an objective test, which requires that the defendant have a reason-
able belief that the use of force was necessary.74 Although this standard appears
stringent, this seemingly rigid rule has some exceptions, and even bears simi-
larities to the more flexible MPC.75
D. Self-Defense Under the California Penal Code
California is one of sixteen states that have resisted the trend to align their
penal codes with the provisions of the MPC.76 The primary statute for justifiable
homicide was enacted in 1850. It permits a person to use deadly force if
threatened with danger that may result in death or great bodily harm.77 Although
California did not adopt the MPC provisions, the California Penal Code contains
two statutes on self-defense which, when viewed together, closely resemble the
MPC provision. 8
Like the MPC provision, California's two statutes establish three elements
that must be met in order to justify a homicide on the basis of self-defense.79 First,
73. See COMMENTARIES § 3.09 cmt. 2 n.12 (1985) (listing states that adhere to this analysis); see also
id. § 3.04 cmt. 2(a) (1985) (commenting that some states added a reasonableness requirement to justify the
belief that it was necessary to use self-defense). Compare CAL. PEAL CODE § 198 (West 1988) (providing that
a person may use deadly force when he has a fear that a reasonable person would have in a similar situation)
with COIMENTARIES § 3.09 cmt. 2 n.11 (1985) (enumerating statutes from other states that reject this
reasoning).
74. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1988).
75. See infra notes 76-93 and accompanying text (comparing the California Penal Code and the Model
Penal Code provisions for self-defense); cf. infra notes 288-301 and accompanying text (discussing the
objective/subjective dichotomy that exists in California regarding the evaluation of evidence regarding a
battered woman defendant's state of mind).
76. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (listing the states which revised their penal codes to
closely resemble the MPC).
77. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1988) (setting forth the state statute for justifiable homicide
which states that a person must have an honest and reasonable belief in the need to defend); People v.
Mallicoat, 27 Cal. App. 355.361, 149 P. 1000, 1002 (1915) (allowing a person to protect himself, even to the
extent of taking a life, when it reasonably appears necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to him); see
also CRIMIALLAW AND PRACnCE OFCALEOIRNIA § 197(1) n.1 (Clinton L. White & Wilbur F. George eds.,
1881) (explaining that the law authorizes homicide only for the purpose of preventing death or great bodily
harm to the intended victim, not for punishment of the aggressor).
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 198 (West 1988) (stating that self-defense may only be used when the fear
would be present in a reasonable person and when the person only acted out of those fears); id. § 197
(permitting the use of deadly force in situations in which the person was fearful of death or great bodily harm).
79. See id. § 197 (West 1988) (asserting that in order to use self-defense, a person must have an honest
and reasonable belief that a danger of death or great bodily harm is present and that a use of force is the only
reasonable alternative); id. § 198 (West 1988) (stating that a person may not use self-defense if the action was
taken for a reason other than fear of death or great bodily harm).
844
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a jury must apply an objective standard of reasonableness to determine whether
sufficient grounds exist for the intended victim's fear.80 In order to decide the
question of reasonableness, a jury must then look to the circumstances sur-
rounding the incident81 Second, deadly force must be the only available alter-
native that would adequately protect the intended victim from the danger.82 For
example, if the intended victim has a reasonable opportunity to escape from the
harm, or to attract a third party's attention to the situation, the intended victim
must opt for one of these alternatives prior to using force." This requirement is
similar to its MPC counterpart.84
Although similar in some ways, the California statute and the MPC pro-
visions differ on several points.85 In California, a defendant claiming self-defense
80. See People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668,679,603 P.2d 1, 7, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84,90 (1979) (specifying
that the honest belief of imminent peril will negate malice, and the reasonableness of the belief will determine
if the killing was justified); People v. Williams, 75 Cal. App. 3d 731, 739, 142 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (1977)
(elaborating that in order to justify a homicide, the defendant must reasonably believe and actually have
sufficient grounds to believe that he was in danger of death); see also People v. Webber, 26 Cal. App. 413, 415,
147 P. 102, 103 (1915) (noting that necessity to kill only exists when an innocent person is placed in sudden
jeopardy and a reasonable person would fear death or great bodily harm); People v. Russell, 19 Cal. App. 750,
754, 127 P. 829, 831 (1912) (providing that if the circumstances supporting the defendant's fear were sufficient
to induce a reasonable person in his situation to believe that he was in imminent danger, the defendant would
be justified in his actions).
81. See People v. Head, 105 Cal. App. 331, 337, 288 P. 106, 109 (1930) (stating that the jury must
consider and determine whether the defendant's testimony supports his belief that his fear was reasonable); see
also Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d at 681, 603 P.2d at 8, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 91 (holding that manslaughter is not the
appropriate conclusion in all cases in which a person uses self-defense in response to an honest but
unreasonable belief); People v. Lewis, 186 Cal. App. 2d 585,588-89,9 Cal. Rptr. 263,270 (1960) (providing
that if a defendant killed another under the honest but unreasonable fear of death or great bodily harm, the
defendant's mental state could be mitigated to manslaughter). See generally People v. Toledo, 85 Cal. App.
2d 577, 580-81, 193 P.2d 953, 955 (1948) (indicating that the defense ofjustifiable homicide does not need
to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, nor by a preponderance of the evidence, but only by evidence that
would create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury).
82. See Webber, 26 Cal. App. at 415, 147 P. at 103 (providing that necessity to kill only exists when
an innocent person is placed in sudden jeopardy and a reasonable person would fear death or great bodily
harm); People v. Conkling, I ll Cal. 616, 626-27 (1896) (stating that in order to justify a homicide, there must
be a present, apparent, and imminent danger to the defendant's life, and the killing must be in response to a
well founded belief that it was undeniably necessary to save the defendant); see also People v. Robertson, 67
Cal. 646, 649, 8 P. 600, 602 (1885) (stating that if the defendant had an opportunity and failed to decline
further combat, and the result was homicide, he could not use the defense of self-protection).
83. For examples of California decisions construing the possible alternatives available to a victim, see
People v. Mizchele, 142 Cal. App. 3d 686, 191 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1983); People v. King, 22 Cal. 3d 12, 582 P.2d
1000, 148 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1978). For examples of other state opinions regarding victim's alternatives, see
Wright v. People, 171 P.2d 990 (Colo. 1946); Kleinbart v. United States, 553 A.2d 1236 (D.C. App. 1989).
84. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (discussing the MPC's requirement that force be
immediately-but not imminently-necessary).
85. See supra notes 76-93 and accompanying text (discussing the differences between the California
self-defense statute and the related MPC provision).
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must not have instigated the conflict that results in the other's death.86 This pre-
requisite encompasses situations in which a defendant causes the conflict by his
own misconduct or by provoking the danger.87 If either circumstance is present,
a defendant may not use the claim of self-defense. 88Moreover, the California self-
defense statute requires that the danger be imminent. 9 Imminence may be
satisfied in cases in which the person's anticipation of danger is based upon the
aggressor's threatening words or acts.9° Words alone, however, are not sufficient
to meet the statute's requirement of imminence.9' In addition to witnessing the
threatening act, the statute requires that the person perceive an imminent fear
from them. 2 Finally, the California statute mandates that the conclusion that
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 198 (West 1988); see People v. Hoover, 107 Cal. App. 635, 639,290 P. 493,
495 (1930) (stating that the defendant was not justified in using deadly force upon the deceased because the
defendant had instigated the fight). But see People v. Farley, 124 Cal. 594, 596, 57 P. 571, 572 (1899)
(concluding that the defendant, who had initiated the conflict, was justified in using self-defense when the
original victim continued to attack him after the defendant had ceased fighting).
87. See People v. Newcomer. 118 Cal. 263,269,50 P. 405,407 (1897) (providing that if a situation
arises by the fault of the defendant due to misconduct or lawlessness, no sufficient ground exists to support the
right to self-defense).
88. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 198 (West 1988) (providing that the surrounding circumstances prompting
self-defense must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person and that the party using deadly force
must act under only the influence of these fears); People v. Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59, 66, 153 P.2d 21, 26 (1944)
(stating that even if the cause is reasonable, the defendant is not justified in using self-defense if he provokes
the danger in any way); People v. Finali, 31 Cal. App. 479, 486, 160 P. 850, 853 (1916) (insisting that a
defendant may not intentionally create a situation in which it appears that he must protect his own life by
killing the person that he was actually assaulting).
89. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1988) (setting forth the self-defense statute); People v. Lucas,
160 Cal. App. 2d 305, 310, 324 P.2d 933, 936 (1958) (stating that the danger must be imminent; the fear that
the danger may become imminent is not adequate); see also supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text
(discussing the difference between the term "imminence," which is used in the California Penal Code, and the
term "immediately necessary," which is used in the MPC); cf. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23(a) (Michie 1982 & Supp.
1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-506(1) (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-704(1) (1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 1992); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-21 (1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 720, para. 517-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-
2(a) (West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 704(3) (West 1993); KAN. CRIM. CODE ANN. § 21-3211 (Vernon 1988);
KY. REV. STAT. § 503.050 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 108 (West 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
563.031(1) (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-3-102 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
627:4(1) (1986); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.15(l) (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-03 (1985); OR.
REV. STAT. § 161.209 (1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(1) (Michie 1990).
90. See People v. Biggins, 65 Cal. 564,565,4 P. 570, 571 (1884) (classifying insulting words in the
category of threatening actions that may prompt the use of self-defense).
91. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1988); see People v. Lucas, 160 Cal. App. 2d 305, 310,324 P.2d
933, 936 (1958) (noting that threats which are not accompanied by an act that would cause the defendant to
have a reasonable belief that he is in danger of bodily harm will not justify a homicide in self-defense); see also
People v. Lombard, 17 Cal. 316, 320 (1861) (stating that although the deceased had verbally threatened the
defendant's life, the latter's mere apprehension was not sufficient to justify homicide because the deceased had
not acted upon these threats).
92. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1988); see CAULIC 5.12 (noting that actual danger is not necessary
to justify self-defense but that a mere fear of death or great bodily injury is not sufficient); People v. Griner
124 Cal. 19, 21, 56 P. 625, 626 (1899) (holding that although the defendant, standing behind the deceased, saw
the deceased holding an ax in his hand and waving it around, there was no justification for the defendant to
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deadly force is required be a reasonable one.9a These provisions comprise the
major differences between the self-defense statutes of the California Penal Code
and the MPC.
There are many possible situations in which a person may perceive an im-
minent fear of harm from another. One common situation emerges between a bat-
tered woman and her abuser.94 Another situation, which is beginning to attract
attention, occurs when a child fears an abusive parent?
II. THE ADMISSmILrrY OF EVIDENCE REGARDING A
DEFENDANT'S STATE OF MIND
Because the defense of self-protection inherently requires an inquiry into the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the use of force, defendants have argued
that evidence of their subjective fear be considered when evaluating their con-
duct.96 A defendant's common argument for requesting an evaluation based on
a subjective fear arises from an imperfect theory of self-defense. The effect of an
imperfect self-defense instruction is that the element of malice aforethought,
which is necessary for murder, is negated due to a mitigating circumstance.
Without proof of malice aforethought, the most severe degree of homicide for
which the defendant can be convicted is manslaughter.
An imperfect theory of self-defense is applicable in a situation in which the
defendant used deadly force with an honest but unreasonable belief of a threat of
danger.97 For example, the imperfect self-defense argument presented by the
Menendez brothers is that they held an honest belief that deadly force was neces-
sary to protect themselves from their parents, although a reasonable person in the
same situation may not have held the same belief. In Menendez, the defendants
argued that due to years of abuse, they honestly believed that their parents' con-
shoot the deceased in the back).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 198 (West 1988); cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-401 to 13-415 (1989 &
Supp. 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35 (McKinney 1987); People v. Gibaldi, 348 N.Y.S.2d 904, 906 (1973)
(discussing reasonable force); Vigil v. People, 353 P.2d 82, 86 (Colo. 1960) (holding that Colorado Revised
Statutes §§ 40-2-13 to 40-2-15, read together, should be the appropriate statute on which to base a jury
instruction for justifiable homicide); State v. Anderson, 51 S.E.2d 895, 896 (N.C. 1949) (holding that self-
defense may only be used in a situation in which a reasonable person would deem it necessary); Sikes v.
Commonwealth, 200 S.W.2d 956,959 (Ky. 1947) (using a reasonable person standard in its analysis of self-
defense). See generally MODELPENALCODE § 3.04 (1985) (excluding a requirement for any reasonable belief).
94. See infra notes 153-170 and accompanying text (discussing the battered woman syndrome).
95. See Scobey, supra note 3, at 181 (noting that children may kill their abusive parents out of genuine
fear for their lives, although the traditional self-defense requirements are absent). Scobey emphasizes that the
lack of self-defense prerequisites is important because self-defense is the child's actual motivation. Id.; see
infra notes 206-222 and accompanying text (discussing the patterns of abuse in cases of battered children).
96. See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977).
97. ARNOLD H. LOEwY, CRIINAL LAW, § 5.04 (1975); see id. (describing another common theory of
imperfect self-defense in which a defendant has an honest but unreasonable belief about the amount of force
necessary to curtail the danger).
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duct indicated that their parents were going to kill them. Further, they argued that
this honest belief, though perhaps unreasonable, negated the element of malice
necessary to convict them of murderf s
Although there are some jurisdictions that do not recognize imperfect self-
defense in the aforementioned situation, the growing trend is to allow evidence
of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the killing in order to assess the
culpability of the defendant. The most common type of state of mind evidence is
presented through the testimony of experts. In the case of an abused child defen-
dant, expert testimony is critical to assist the trier of fact in understanding the
effects of continuous abuse, but it also lends credence to the defendant's account
of the events at the time of the killing." In a recent case, Commonwealth v.
Sheppard,1°° the majority upheld the defendant's conviction of murder by holding
that the objective evidence surrounding the killing did not justify imperfect self-
defense; therefore, there was no need to admit psychiatric testimony to attempt
to substantiate the defendant's claims.01 The dissenting opinion argued that based
on the evidence, the defendant was the only one to testify that he was acting in
self-defense and thus evidence of his state of mind was essential to assess his
culpability.'02
In 1994, the California Supreme Court upheld imperfect self-defense in a case
in which a defendant who held an honest but mistaken belief of imminent danger
used deadly force.'0 3 The case, In re Christian,1°4 involved a seventeen-year-old
boy who shot and killed a nineteen-year-old boy.'05 The defendant had been con-
tinuously taunted for over a year by the other boy, a reputed skinhead gang
member.' 6 On the day of the killing, the gang member chased the defendant onto
the beach and continued to tease and threaten him.1°7 The Court of Appeal found
that there was sufficient evidence to show that when the defendant fired the gun
he feared the infliction of serious harm.103 In reversing the murder conviction, the
appellate court stated that under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, the
98. See Gail D. Cox, Abuse Excuse; Success Grows, NAT'L L.J., May 9,1994, at Al (explaining that
the Menendez strategy of defense was to claim imperfect self-defense when they honestly, if unreasonably,
thought their parents were going to kill them).
99. See People of the State of California v. Bradshaw, No. 146426 (1994) (providing an example of a
case in which the jury convicted the abused child defendant of manslaughter although the son lay in wait for
his father and shot him in the head repeatedly until his father stopped breathing).
100. No. 94-1683 (Pa. Super. 1994); Superior Court, PA. L. WKLY., Oct. 24, 1994, at 14.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. In re Christian, 7 Cal. 4th 768,772, 872 P.2d 574,575,30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33,34 (1994); see People
v. Trevino, 200 Cal. App. 3d 874, 879,246 Cal. Rptr. 357,359 (1988) (holding that a defendant who claimed
self-defense was required to act on the basis of reasonable fear alone, whether the danger was real or mistaken),
104. 7 Cal. 4th 768, 872 P.2d 574, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33 (1994).
105. Cox, supra note 98, at Al.
106. Christian, 7 Cal. 4th at 772, 872 P.2d at 575, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34.
107. Id.
108. Id., 872 P.2d at 576, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 35.
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defendant could not be convicted of anything more serious than manslaughter."°
Justice Baxter, writing for the majority, explained that the harm feared must be
imminent. "Fear of future harm-no matter how great the fear and no matter how
great the likelihood of the harm-will not suffice."' 10 The justification for
allowing imperfect self-defense is that without it, judges would be compelled to
find defendants guilty of murder unless the killing took place in clear self-
defense.
Evidence of a defendant's state of mind has been admitted for several years
in the case of battered woman defendants who killed their abusers. One of the
earliest cases relied upon as support for this practice is State v. Wanrow, "' which
provided the legal system with an opportunity to present evidence of the defen-
dant's state of mind in a case of self-defense.
In Wanrow, the defendant woman shot and killed a man who had broken into
her home and had threatened her person and family." 2 She was convicted of
second degree murder."t 3 On appeal, the defense argued that the trial court should
have used evidence of the defendant's state of mind to evaluate the defendant's
fear of the present danger."4 The Washington Supreme Court held that the trial
court had improperly instructed the jury on the appropriate law of self-defense. 5
The court ruled that the defendant's actions should be evaluated in reference to
her subjective impressions rather than under an objective standard of reason-
ableness."t 6 The decision appeared to provide an alternative for woman defen-
dants in self-defense cases by permitting evidence of the woman's state of mind
at the time of the killing to be considered when evaluating her use of force.'
Subsequent cases have shown, however, that the admission of evidence regarding
the defendant's state of mind in Wanrow did not have the effect of reducing con-
victions as many had hoped."8
109. Id. at 772-73, 872 P.2d at 576,30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 35.
110. Id. at 783, 872 P.2d at 583, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 42.
111. 559 P.2d 548 (Vash. 1977).
112. Wanrow, 559 P.2d at 551. The defendant was not only petite in stature, but was also dependent on
crutches. Id. at 548.
113. Id. at 551.
114. Id. at 548. The defendant's attorneys argued that the only fair standard by which to evaluate the
degree of reasonableness of a woman's use of self-defense is to use a subjective test to measure the particular
individual's perspective of the danger with which she was threatened. Id.
115. Id. at 555.
116. Id. at 558.
117. Id.
118. See CYNTHIA K. GIu.EsPIE, JUSTIFIABLEHOMICIDE-BATrERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE AND THE
LAW 118 (1989) (observing that the Wanrow decision did not have as great an impact on the outcome of
women's self-defense cases as many had hoped). For examples of cases in which the subjective standard for
evaluating a woman defendant's mental state was denied, see State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43, 53 (Wash. 1994);
People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758,762 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564, 566 (Wash. 1984);
Commonwealth v. Dillon, 562 A.2d 885, 889 (Pa. Super. 1989).
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Although state of mind evidence was not admissible in cases of female
defendants generally, the evidence was allowed in cases in which a woman had
been abused by her victim. "9 This evidence, in conjunction with specific psycho-
logical criteria, is now commonly referred to as the battered woman defense.'
IH. STATE OF MIND EVIDENCE AND THE BATTERED WOMAN DEFENDANT
Over the past twenty years, the criminal justice system has come to recognize
that abuse of women by men is a widespread societal problem.'2' Although it is
more prevalent between spouses, all forms of physical abuse towards women
have received considerable attention.'12 In most situations, the women are psycho-
logically trapped in their abusive relationships.'23 In spite of the numerous pro-
tective and counseling resources available, because they have been abused on a
119. See infra notes 125, 171-193 and accompanying text (indicating that evidence of a defendant's state
of mind is admissible in cases in which the defendant woman had beer, abused).
120. Id.
121. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369-70 (N.J. 1984) (noting that between 1974 and 1984,
sociologists examined with greater frequency the causes of wife-beating and other domestic violence). For a
sampling of recent literature on the subject, see, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The
Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991); Mary Ann Dutton,
Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191 (1993); Karla Fischer, et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117 (1993); Catherine F. Klein, Providing Legal Protection for
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993); Joan S. Meier,
Notesfrom the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence Theory
and Practice, 21 HoFSTRA L. REV. 1295 (1993); Jane C. Murphy, Lawyeringfor Social Change: The Power
of the Narrative in Domestic Violence Law Reform. 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243 (1993); Report on Domestic
Violence: A Commitment to Action, 28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 313 (1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity
and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
520 (1992); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1992); Denise Bricker, Note, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered Woman's Syndrome
Expert Testimony for Gay Men and Lesbians Who Kill Abusive Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 520 (1992); Laura
S. Harper, Note, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues After DeShaney
v. Winnebago County of Department of Social Services, 75 CORN. L. REV. 1393 (1990); Maryanne E.
Kampmann, Note, The Legal Victimization of Battered Women, 15 WoMEN's RTS. L. REP. 101 (1993); Rhonda
L. Kohler, Comment, The Battered Women and Tort Law: A New Approach to Fighting Domestic Violence,
25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1025 (1992); Elena Salzman, Note, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence
Prevention Program: A Model Legal Framework for Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REV. 329
(1994); Bernadette Dunn Sewell, Note, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative Responses to the
Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983 (1989).
122. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 370 (observing that those affected by familial violence include more than
just the family members, but also strangers to the family who feel the impact of the psychological damage);
see also Antonia C. Novello, The Domestic Violence Issue: Hear Our Voices, AM. MED. NEws (Mar. 23, 1992)
and (Mar. 30, 1992); Elizabeth A. Pendo, Recognizing Violence Against Women: Gender and The Hate Crimes
Statistics Act, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 157, nn.33-36 (1994) (discussing the recent attention that Congress has
given to the pervasive violence against women).
123. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 370 (noting that domestic violence causes great psychological harm); see
also LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATERED WOMAN xiv-xv (1979); Scobey, supra note 3, at 184-85 (discussing
the psychological impact of abuse on battered women).
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consistent basis over an extended period of time, the women in this situation often
feel that they will never be safe from their abusers and that killing their abusers
is their only viable means of escape.' 24 Courts have relied on expert testimony to
explain this mystifying psychological bond and have come to recognize a
derivative of the self-defense theory-the battered woman's defense.'
25
A. The Emergence of the Theory
Societal recognition of the plight of battered women has increased over the
last two decades.26 Recently, the battered woman syndrome has been recognized
by courts as a psychological condition that prevents an abused woman from
leaving her batterer. 127 Today, these women are allowed to show in court, through
expert witnesses and other testimony, that persistent abuse had impaired them
psychologically to the point where it was impossible for them to physically
escape their abusive environments.2 Thus, with no alternative available, they
resorted to killing their batterers.'9 Child defendants have attempted to analogize
their situations and psychological conditions to battered women, by asserting a
theory of imperfect self-defense referred to as the battered child defense.30
Because the battered child defense is premised largely by analogy to the battered
woman defense, in order to better understand the effects of abuse on children, it
is helpful to first examine, in some detail, the psychological impact of abuse on
women.
1. The History of Spousal Abuse
Before 1874, a husband was permitted to beat his wife without being subject
to punishment.' To illustrate, a Mississippi court held in 1824 that a moderate
124. See Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372 (noting that battered women are usually unwilling to reach out for help,
either out of shame, fear of reprisal by their husbands, or concern that they will not be believed).
125. See infra notes 171-193 and accompanying text (discussing the battered woman defense).
126. WAi.KIt, supra note 123, at ix; see supra note 121 and accompanying text (surveying a sampling
of recent legal literature on the battered woman syndrome); infra notes 131-151 and accompanying text
(discussing the gradual evolution of societal sensitivity toward the condition known as the battered woman
syndrome).
127. WALKER, supra note 123, at 221; see infra notes 153-170 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of understanding psychological impact of abuse on battered women).
128. See infra notes 171-193 and accompanying text (discussing the forms and the purpose of expert
testimony in courtroom).
129. Id.
130. See infra notes 224-286 and accompanying text (discussing selected cases in which the child
defendant attempted to argue a defense based on a subjective fear).
131. Terry Davidson, Wifebeating: A Recurring Phenomenon Throughout History, in BATrERED
WOMEN: A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY oF DoMEsTic VIOLENCE 2, 2-23 (Maria Roy, ed., 1977); id.
(providing a historical overview of men's treatment of women, beginning in pre-Biblical times); see id. at 4
(quoting Sue E. Eisenberg & Patricia A. Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited (An Exploratory
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form of reprimand was proper for a husband to use on his wife in order to rein-
force his control over domestic affairs. 132 Alabama and Massachusetts had wife-
beating privileges until they were repealed in 1871.133 In 1874, the state of North
Carolina outlawed wife-whipping, although it refused to hear complaints
regarding physical abuse from battered women.'3
California did not enact a statute prohibiting spousal abuse until 1845.t35 The
California Penal Code also contains other statutes which may have been enacted
for the purpose of reducing marital violence. 36 Some of these laws address the
unique underlying elements that comprise the typical pattern of spousal vio-
lence. t37 These features include the role of the victim, the reaction of the offender
to the victim's behavior, and the victim's reaction to the abuse.'
38
Spousal abuse possesses its own characteristic pattern. 39 In most domestic
abuse situations, the victim inadvertently provokes her batterer by words or
actions which is met with a response of physical violence. 40 The man's sub-
sequent violent reaction to a woman's verbal acts can be explained under two
Legal Study of Wifebeating in Michigan) (1974) (unpublished, University of Michigan Law School (Ann
Arbor))) (reporting that the husband was allowed to beat his wife with a stick, pull her hair, choke her, spit on
her, and kick her about the floor); see also Ephesians 5:22, 24 (quoting the Apostle Paul as saying, "Wives,
submit yourselves unto your own husbands .... For the husband is the head of the wife").
132. See Bradley v. State, I Miss. 156, 158 (1824) (ruling that a husband should be allowed to use a form
ofchastisement in extreme cases, and "salutary restraint" in every case of his wife's misbehavior, without being
subjected to bothersome prosecution).
133. See Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 147.48 (1871) (providing that a husband is not justified or
allowed to use a weapon or any other method to moderately discipline his wife); see also Commonwealth v.
McAfee, 108 Mass. 458, 461 (1871) (noting that beating or violently striking a wife is not one of the rights
conferred upon a husband through marriage).
134. See State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60,61 (1874) (holding that unless there is permanent injury, malice or
cruelty, the charge of abuse is trivial and the courts will not hear such complaints from battered women),
135. 1945 Cal. Stat. ch. 1312, sec. I, at 2462 (enacting California Penal Code § 273d); see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 273.5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (incorporating former California Penal Code § 273d and providing
that any spouse or cohabitant who willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon the
other spouse or cohabitant is guilty of a felony); see also People v. Bums, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 873, 200 P.2d
134, 137-38 (1948) (defining corporal injury under the original statute as the touching of a person against his
will with physical force in an intentional, hostile, and aggravated manner); id. (quoting 63 Cal. Jur., Traunia,
804 (1933)) (defining traumatic condition as any injury to the body caused by external violence).
136. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 753, 6300-6388 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (providing the statutory
guidelines regarding restraining orders and orders to vacate the home); CAL. PENAL. CODE § 415 (West 1988)
(intending to prevent disruption of the peace through vulgarity and loud boisterous interactions); id. § 12024
(West Supp. 1995) (prohibiting the possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to assault another); Id. § 837
(West 1988) (allowing a spouse to make a citizen's arrest for assault and battery).
137. See Richard J. Gelles, No Place To Go: The Social lnamics of Marital Violence, in BAITERED
WOMiEN-A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 46 (Maria Roy, ed., 1977) (explaining that
understanding the dynamics of marital violence may be a way to decrease the incidence).
138. WALKER, supra note 123, at xv.
139. Id.
140. See Gelles, supra note 137, at 57 (tracing a consistent pattern in the interactions which lead to
marital violence and finding that verbal aggression is a common precursor to physical aggression).
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theories.'4 ' Under the first theory, people who are emotionally tied to each other
for a significant length of time become proficient at recognizing and verbally
criticizing each other's weaknesses. 42 The abusive spouse uses this knowledge
to control and degrade his spouse. Under the second theory, individuals who have
low self-esteem perceive a negative statement as a challenge to their already-
fragile self-images. 43 Therefore, the batterer misinterprets his victim's banal
comments as a personal assault and resort to physical violence in response."
Despite the abuse inflicted upon them, battered women commonly remain in
their abusive environment rather than leave.' 45 The variables that combine to trap
victims of abuse in their surroundings include the extent of the violence exper-
ienced; childhood memories they harbor of their own parents' abusive relation-
ship; the lack of economic and social resources; and the inadequate response of
law enforcement to the abuse. 146
Although there have been statutes that prohibit spousal abuse, law enforce-
ment and the judicial system have historically been reluctant to interfere in
domestic problems. 47 Until recently, the prevailing attitude of the police was that
marital problems needed to be resolved within the confines of the marriage.
48
Thus, women who might have considered calling the police for help realized that
it would probably be more effective if they attempted to help themselves.4 9
Under these circumstances, the only plausible alternative to eliminate abuse was
to eliminate the abuser.
141. Id. at 58.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 59 (reporting that approximately half of the 80 family members that responded to the
study remained in the abusive relationship even though there was a likelihood of abuse at least once a month);
see also WALKER, supra note 123, at ix (noting that women do not remain in their relationships because they
like being battered, but because of complex psychological and sociological reasons).
146. See Gelles, supra note 137, at 59 (setting forth the aforementioned factors that appear to dictate the
actions of abused wives).
147. See id. at 60 (conceding that even if a woman attempts to get help to escape her abusive environ-
ment, her chances of getting effective assistance from the community are minimal); see also GILLESPIE, supra
note 118, at 135 (acknowledging that battered women in general do not think that they can rely on the police,
the courts, neighbors, relatives, or anyone else for protection from their abusers); WALKER, supra note 123,
at 43 (indicating that police, courts, hospitals, and social service agencies do not offer adequate protection to
women who are victims of domestic violence); id. at 206 (stating that battered women repeatedly report to
social scientists that police do not adequately protect them from their batterers). See generally Elizabeth
Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23"HAsINGs LJ. 259, 262 (1971) (discussing the legal
protection available to victims of spousal abuse).
148. WALKER, supra note 123, at 206.
149. See Gi.LEsPm, supra note 118, at 135-36 (noting that some women have found that attempts to call
for outside assistance have proved futile; therefore, their only alternative has been to protect themselves); see
also Gelles. supra note 137, at 60-61 (stating that many service agencies are unwilling to help a battered
woman).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 26
Though spousal abuse has become recognized as a social ill and criminalized
as a violent offense, the growing incidences of homicide in which abusive
spouses have been killed as a solution to domestic violence has raised some con-
cerns. Some psychiatrists began to research the reasons why these battered
women did not leave their partners instead.' This research resulted in a theory
of defense which focuses on the psychological impact that abuse has on battered
women.1
5 1
2. Recognition of the Battered Woman Syndrome
The problem of spousal abuse has received public attention only within the
past twenty years. 52 In 1975, Dr. Lenore E. Walker began a pioneering study of
the issues facing battered women.' Evidence gathered from her research
demonstrates that abusive relationships entail both physical and psychological
violence.' 4 Through analyses of such relationships, Dr. Walker created a working
definition of a "battered woman.'15 A "battered woman" is one who has been
physically, sexually, or psychologically abused by a man with whom she shares
an intimate relationship, who coerces her to do as he wishes without regard for
her rights. 56
Most of the abuse in an abusive relationship is psychological, so the primary
reasons why women remain in abusive situations are psychosocial.' 57 The pre-
dominant psychological explanation for the failure of women to leave an abusive
relationship is learned helplessness. 58 The underlying rationale of the learned
helplessness theory is that the batterer so completely commands every aspect of
the woman's life that she comes to believe that she cannot function without that
degree of control.159 A point arrives, however, at which the woman who lives in
150. WALKER, supra note 123, at xi.
151. Id. at xv; see State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (NJ. 1984) (providing that battered women who
killed their abusers share several common traits which serve as a basis for the defense).
152. WALKER, supra note 123, at ix.
153. Id. atxi.
154. Id. at xiv.
155. Id. at xiv-xv.
156. See id. at xv (providing that a man's abusive behavior often occurs in a specific cycle, at least
twice). Walker states that any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship once; however, if it occurs
a second time and she remains in the situation, she is classified as a battered woman. Id.
157. See id. at 43 (explaining that many women stay in the relationship because of economic, legal, and
social dependence, while others are afraid to leave because they have no safe place to go); see also GILLESPIE,
supra note 118, at 127 (stating that violent men use psychological techniques to intimidate and control women,
primarily through verbal harassment and criticism).
158. WALKER, supra note 123, at 43. A thorough discussion of learned helplessness theory is beyond
the scope of this comment. For further detail, see id. at 42-54.
159. Id. at42.
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a state of "constant anticipatory terror"' 6 no longer wants to tolerate the abuse.'
As a result, some battered women conclude that the only effective method to end
the abuse is to kill their abusers. 62
Many women have been tried for the killings of their abusive husbands or
cohabitants.' 63 In many of these cases, Dr. Walker has given expert testimony that
these female defendants suffered from a psychological condition known as the
"battered woman's syndrome. '"' As developed by Dr. Walker, the syndrome
consists of a pattern common among abused women who have killed their bat-
terers.165 The pattern suggests that a battered woman (1) believes that her batterer
is going to kill her; (2) suffers an extraordinarily brutal assault prior to the mur-
der; (3) has an uncontrollable fear of her batterer; (4) does not realize that her
batterer is dead, and for months after his death, speaks as though the batterer is
still controlling her behavior, and (5) states that she did not intend to kill her bat-
terer, but only intended to prevent him from killing her.'6 The last feature, that
the woman killed the batterer in order to save her own life, is the basis of the
woman's claim of self-defense. 67
The main problem that arises under this claim of self-defense is that most
states require that the victim of abuse be threatened with imminent harm and use
the least force necessary to escape the batterer.168 Although most of these women
have the opportunity to physically leave the abuse, they do not leave because
often they find it too difficult to break the emotional bond.169 This psychological
condition, to which the abused women attribute their violent behavior, requires
defendants to rely heavily on expert witnesses for a medical explanation which
may enable juries to view the defendant's behavior from her psychological
position. 70
160. See G.LESI,, supra note 118, at 131 (describing a battered woman's mental state, which consists
of continuously building tension caused by the woman's attempts to control as many details of her life as
possible in order to prevent her batterer from being triggered into rage). The combination of the strain of the
tension, the emotional and physical toll, and the knowledge that her life may depend on her ability to ward off
an impending beating for as long as possible creates an intolerable situation for the battered woman. Id.
161. See WALKER, supra note 123, at 43 (remarking that her research has shown that women remain in
abusive relationships because of complex psychosocial reasons, not because they enjoy being beaten).
162. See GrILEPm, supra note 118, at 144 (observing that some battered women believe that they cannot
rely on society to protect them from the violence; thus, it is logical for them to conclude that if they are to be
protected, they must seize whatever means necessary to protect themselves).
163. WALKER, supra note 123, at 220.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 54-68, 76-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Model Penal Code and
California statutory provisions for self-defense).
169. WALKER, supra note 123, at 220.
170. See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 373 (NJ. 1984) (setting forth the court's test to determine the
admissibility of expert testimony as whether the testimony is relevant to the defendant's claim of self-defense
and whether such proffer meets the evidentiary standards for admissibility).
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B. Presenting Evidence of the Battered Woman Syndrome in the Courtroom
There are two burdens that the battered woman must meet at trial: (1)
Explaining to the jury that the emotional damage she incurred by living in a con-
stantly violent and threatening situation affected her judgment; and (2) convincing
the jury that her fear of death or great bodily harm was reasonable. 171 The primary
method used to satisfy these burdens is expert testimony on the subject of the bat-
tered woman syndrome.' 2 The expert's testimony includes an objective deter-
mination as to whether the woman's behavior was entirely consistent with that of
a battered woman.' 73 The purpose of this testimony is to help the jury understand
the woman's state of mind and consequently, her belief that it was necessary to
kill her batterer in the particular situation. 74
1. Expert Witness Testimony
One function of expert witness testimony is to emphasize that the battered
woman's syndrome is not a form of insanity defense.'75 The expert usually
explains that the woman is suffering from emotional trauma, not a mental dis-
order. 76 The distinction is legally significant because if the woman is found to
have a mental disorder, she can be committed to a mental institution. 77 However,
171. GIr LTP. supra note 118, at 123; cf supra notes 54-68, 76-93 and accompanying text (discussing
the Model Penal Code and California statutory provisions for self-defense); id. (discussing the burdens of proof
under each statute).
172. Scobey, supra note 3, at 187-88; see People v. Patino, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1737, 1745, 32 Cal, Rptr.
2d 345, 349 (1994) (finding that expert testimony is admissible to explain a child sexual abuse victim's state
of mind). For examples of cases which allowed expert testimony to explain the battered woman syndrome, see
Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So.2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982), cert. denied, 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1982); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981); People v. Minnis,
455 N.E.2d 209 (111. App. 1983); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J.
1984); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1985); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983); State v.
Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984). But see State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988) (holding that the
battered woman syndrome could be used when the woman had no fear of imminent bodily harm).
173. GiImiEs , supra note 118, at 158.
174. Id. at 159-60; see id. at 158 (classifying spousal abuse among those subjects that necessitate expert
testimony during trial in order to aid the jury's understanding of the complex intricacies of psychological
trauma).
175. See id. at 160 (stressing that the testimony does not serve to argue that the defendant should not be
held responsible for her actions because she suffers from a mental illness). It is not the purpose of expert
witness testimony tojustify the battered woman's act of killing her abuser in order to give her more legal rights
than others, nor is it to attempt to rationalize the woman's actions as revenge. Id. at 159.
176. Id. at 160. The battered woman syndrome focuses on the woman's state of mind, but does not
suggest that she is mentally ill. Id.
177. See Parkin v. State, 238 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970) (providing that an acquittal due to the insanity
defense may confine the defendant in a mental institution for an indefinite time), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
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if the woman is found to suffer from emotional trauma, she can be acquitted on
the basis of self-defense or found guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter.178
One of the biggest obstacles for an abused woman who is attempting to use
any form of self-defense is to prove that the threatened harm was sufficiently
imminent to warrant protective action.1' This obstacle is often the reason why
abused woman defendants forego a claim of self-defense and plead insanity or
guilty in exchange for a reduction in the charge and sentence.180 The incentive to
plead guilty to a lesser degree of homicide has been increased by a recent change
in the law permitting the court to consider the defendant's actual physical ability
to defend herself from her abuser in a nondeadly way."'
2. Admitting Evidence of the State of Mind of a Battered Woman
Defendant
Many states now recognize the battered woman syndrome as legitimate
evidence of self-defense. 8 2 The evidence focuses on the psychological impact
that an abusive relationship has on a woman.83 Most courts give the defendant
considerable latitude in the use of expert witnesses to explain the effects of
abuse.8"
178. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 419 A.2d 406, 408-09 (NJ. 1980); State v. Mendoza, 258 N.W.2d 260,
274 (Wis. 1977) (holding that denying a defendant a jury instruction on a theory of imperfect self-defense in
addition to a theory of perfect self-defense is prejudicial error); see also Parkin, 238 So. 2d at 822 (providing
that acquittal based upon self-defense may allow a defendant to go free).
179. See GILLESPIE, supra note 118, at 76 (stating that this requirement has been a major hurdle to
supporting a self-defense argument and has led to many convictions because of the objective standard by which
the jury must evaluate the evidence).
180. See id. at 76 (providing examples of cases in which the defendants opted for an insanity plea or a
guilty plea to a lesser offense). In one instance, Gillespie discusses Francine Hughes, a woman who suffered
continuous abuse and futile attempts to leave her spouse, who raised an insanity defense during the murder trial
in which she was accused of pouring gasoline over her then ex-husband as he slept and setting the house on
fire. Id. Gillespie also describes the situation of Eileen Bartosh who was charged with the murder of her
abusive husband and pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, although she had suffered severe physical and
psychological abuse for 18 months of marriage. Id. at 76-77.
181. See id. at 116 (arguing that there should be some flexibility in the law which would permit a court
to consider the actions of each defendant, male or female, in light of the defendant's actual ability to defend
against an offender in a nondeadly way). This change in the law was affirmed by the Washington Supreme
Court in State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977). GILLESPrE, supra note 118, at 118. This standard used
by the Wanrow court was not an objective reasonable person standard; rather, the court considered whether
this defendant, with her unique viewpoint, acted reasonably under the particular circumstances. Id.; see supra
notes 111-118 and accompanying text (discussing the Wanrow case).
182. See, e.g., ILL ANN. STAT. Ch. 720, para. 5/9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN.,
Evidence § 10-916 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.033 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1994); Oftfo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2901.06 (Page 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 733 (West 1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.050 (West
1988 & Supp. (1995); Wyo. STAT. § 6-1-203(b) (1994).
183. WALKER, supra note 123, at xv, 75; Scobey, supra note 3, at 184.
184. See supra notes 175-181 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of expert witness
testimony in cases involving battered woman defendants).
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One of the early cases to allow the battered woman defense was State v.
Kelly.185 In Kelly, a wife stabbed her abusive husband to death.1 86 The defendant
claimed that her husband's behavior frightened her into thinking that he would
harm her.'8 After hearing testimony from expert witnesses on the psychological
aspects of the battered woman syndrome, the court held that the syndrome is an
appropriate subject on which an expert may testify and a jury may consider as a
defense.'" Furthermore, the court concluded that testimony of the battered
woman syndrome may be admitted if the syndrome is relevant to the defendant's
claim of self-defense and if specific state standards are met for admitting expert
testimony." 9
The concept and rationale of the battered woman syndrome has been ex-
tended to other situations."9 For example, a homosexual man was able to success-
fully use battered woman/spouse syndrome evidence to obtain an acquittal of the
murder of his partner.91 The latest extension of self-defense based on the victim's
fear of abuse is in the case of battered children who kill their parents. 92 The
theory offered by children is that they have been repeatedly abused by either one
or both parents and, on a particular occasion, perceived an action by the parent as
a threat of death or great bodily injury.' 93
IV. STATE OF MIND EVIDENCE AND THE BATrERED CHILD DEFENDANT
Whether parricide"9 can be justified is probably one of the most challenging
decisions a court may have to make. There have only been a few states in which
courts have allowed evidence regarding the state of mind of a battered child
defendant to be admitted. Many of these states have not decided upon its admis-
185. 478 A.2d 364 (NJ. 1983).
186. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 368.
187. See id. at 369 (recounting that the defendant saw her husband running toward her with his hands
raised, at which point she was unsure if he had armed himself while he was out of her presence).
188. Id. at 368.
189. Id. at 373.
190. See GILLESPIE, supra note 118, at 159-60 (discussing other possible extensions of this defense,
including rape trauma syndrome and post traumatic stress disorder).
191. Julie Emery, Battered-Woman Defense Gets Gay Man Acquitted of Murder, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov.
21, 1986, at B I; see Lynda Gorov. Battered by a Woman; Lesbian Who Killed Abuser Seeks Pardon, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 10, 1993, at 21 (reporting that a lesbian who was convicted of the manslaughter of her lover
sought to obtain a pardon based on her claim that she had been abused during their relationship). But see
Lesbian Convicted of Beating Her Lover, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1990, at B2 (describing a case in which a
lesbian defendant was found guilty of repeatedly striking her lover despite the presentation of evidence that
she had been abused).
192. Scobey, supra note 3, at 182; see supra notes 8-9, 17-18, infra notes 193-286 and accompanying
text (discussing the use of psychological evidence in cases of battered child defendants).
193. Id.
194. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1117 (6th ed. 1990) (defining parricide as the crime of killing one's
father).
1995 / Battered Child Defendants-Admissibility of State of Mind Evidence
sibility due to procedural errors in the lower courts' proceedings.'95 Although
there are few definite positions espoused by these courts, it is possible for Cali-
fornia courts to look to some of the considerations by other states' courts when
contemplating the admissibility of evidence regarding a battered child defendant's
state of mind.' 96
A. The Theory
Recently, when evaluating a battered child defendant's claim of self-defense,
the focus has been on the child's state of mind at the time of the killing.97 The
reason for this emphasis is that abused children argue that they feared their
parents were going to kill them.198 This belief prompted the children to use deadly
force to protect themselves!" 9
Parricide, however, is generally not committed as an immediate response to
abuse; rather, children generally plot to kill their parents for days or weeks before
the actual murders. 2t ° The most famous parricide case is Lizzie Borden's muti-
lation murders of her parents in 1892.21 The prosecution speculated that her
195. See infra notes 224-286 and accompanying text (discussing other states' treatment of evidence of
the state of mind of a battered child).
196. See id. (discussing the factors considered by other states in contemplating the admissibility of state
of mind evidence of a battered child).
197. Scobey, supra note 3. at 181. But see Sacks, supra note 18, at 349 (acknowledging that the
admissibility of evidence regarding a battered woman defendant's state of mind has not been extended to
battered children). Compare Steven R. Hicks, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Psychology of the
Battered Child, 11 LAW & PSYcHoL. REV. 103, 103-04 (1987) (defining a battered child) with RAY E. HELFER
& Rum S. KEMPE, THE BATrERE CHILD 249-51 (1968) (defining a "battered baby" as an infant or a child who
has suffered multiple episodes of abuse, as indicated by the presence of recent healing and healed injuries on
the skin or skull).
198. See Scobey, supra note 3, at 184 (indicating that children may kill their abusive parents out of
genuine fear for their lives, even if their actions do not meet the statutory requirements of self-defense);
Church, supra note 5, at 68 (explaining that according to the battered child defense theory, a child can be so
terrorized by years of abuse that the child genuinely reads danger, whether or not it is actually present, in any
look, act, or words by the parent, which an objective person would not perceive); see also Hicks, supra note
197, at 105 (explaining that the battered child syndrome focused on the physical effects of abuse).
199. See Scobey, supra note 3, at 185 (noting that self-defense is the primary motivation for children
in a parricide); Greggory Morris, The Kids Next Door: Sons and Daughters Who Kill Their Parents, 17 CJA
§ 37278, Abstract (discussing the psychological motivation behind parricide).
200. MONES, supra note 19, at 15. Most of the limited research is from a psychiatric perspective and
probes the child's mental processes, without taking into consideration the parents' actions. Id. at 6; see Scobey,
supra note 3, at 185 (providing that the key to the battered child defense is the recognition that children learn
to predict when their parents are going to harm them, and live with that fear daily); infra notes 224-286 and
accompanying text (discussing and analyzing five cases which have addressed the subject of parricide); see
also Hicks, supra note 197, at 104 (explaining that a child learns over time the events which can prompt a
parent to react in an abusive manner).
201. Edgar Lustgarten, The Lizzie Borden "Axe Murder" Case, in GREAT COURTROOM BATLES 1
(Richard E. Rubenstein, ed., 1973). This case was the most sensational murder trial of nineteenth century
America. Id.
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motive was hatred for her parents. However, Borden was acquitted of the
murders, and there is still discussion as to whether, based on the facts of the case
and the testimony of witnesses, the verdict was correct.20 3 Although the specific
facts in the Borden case cannot be revisited, there is a chance that with today's
focus on child abuse, the justice system will have more opportunities to consider
the effect of abuse on children through parricide cases.' In fact, common pat-
terns of parricide are emerging. 5
B. Emerging Patterns
Based on parricide cases that have unfolded within the last decade, social
scientists are developing a profile of those involved in these murders.206 There are
similar characteristics among the children who kill, the parents who are killed,
and the manner in which the parricides are committed.20 7
Most of the children who commit parricide are Caucasian males between the
ages of sixteen and eighteen, who come from middle-to-upper class families.2"'
Generally, these children have either never been arrested or have only been
charged with non-violent crimes like vandalism or shoplifting.2°9They are usually
average or above-average students, loners, eager to please their peers, and overly
polite to adults. 10 Although their demeanor may appear calm, they have usually
been physically, mentally, and sexually abused for years, and typically have wit-
nessed abuse of other family members.2 '
202. Id. at 12.
203. Id. at 31-32. Since Borden's death, 34 years after the murders, students of crime have endlessly
debated the propriety of the verdict. Id; see MONES, supra note 19, at 8 (referring to Ann Jones, Women Who
Kill, which theorized that Borden was acquitted because, although there was convincing evidence to the
contrary, the community and jury found it difficult to comprehend that a proper lady like Lizzie Borgen could
have committed such heinous acts); see also Lawrence Meyer, Kids Who Kill Parents, WASH. POST, May 13,
1984, at W14 (speculating that neighbors of abusive families see the killings as random and are often unable
to imagine that a child's fear was the cause).
204. See infra notes 324-343 and accompanying text (speculating on the possible ramifications of the
recognition of the battered child defense).
205. MONES, supra note 19, at 13-15.
206. Scobey, supra note 3, at 184; MoNEs, supra note 19, at 13-15.
207. Scobey, supra note 3, at 186.
208. MONES, supra note 19, at 13.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 14; see Meyer, supra note 203, at W14 (reporting that parricide usually occurs in families that
appear "normal" to others).
211. MoNEs, supra note 19, at 14. Mones concedes, however, that not all children who kill are victims
of abuse. Id. at 16; see Patricia Callahan, When a Child Kills a Parent, Does Abuse Forgive the Act?, CHI.
TRI., June 17, 1993, at 16 (quoting Joy Byers, Associate Communications Director for the National Com-
mittee to Prevent Child Abuse, who observed that abused children "internalize the abuse they see 'over a long
period of time' until they reach a breaking point").
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The parents of these children also share common characteristics.2 12 Usually,
they have successful careers and reputations for being hardworking and honest. 13
Typically, they are private people, with no substance abuse problems."4 Their
main flaw is that they believe they have an absolute right to control their children
in any way they see fit.215 Most of these parents beat their children, not for disci-
plinary reasons, but because they are addicted to their power over them and
because they glean satisfaction from using this power.2
16
The parricides also tend to have a consistent pattern.2 17 Usually, they occur
when the parent is in a vulnerable position.18 The parents are usually killed while
sleeping, watching television, or cooking with their backs turned to the child 19
It is common for the child to devise a plan for the killing and share it with friends
days before the act.m Most of the children are convicted because they rarely deny
the killing.2 1 Although the children usually appear passive, most of them
demonstrate an "overkill factor" during the killing by shooting, clubbing, or stab-
bing the parent numerous times.22 Recognizing similar patterns in parricides is
a significant step in understanding the state of mind of battered children. Through
continuous research, social scientists will be able to provide more detailed explan-
ations of the psychological effects of abuse on children.
Although the common characteristics of parricides have been identified, there
has only been one well-publicized California case to consider the long-term
effects of abuse on children.m' This fact is important to note because California
is considered by many legal authorities as a leading state in adjudicating novel
concepts of law, and the California courts have not yet had the opportunity to
fully consider whether evidence regarding the state of mind of a battered child
212. MONES, supra note 19, at 14-15.
213. Id. at 14.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 15.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.; see Louis Sahagun, Murder Case Opens Eyes to Horrfic Tale of Child Abuse, L.A.TIMES, Sept.
9, 1993, at Al (quoting attorney Paul Mones as saying that parricides almost always occur when the adult is
not aggressing towards the child).
219. MONE.s, supra note 19, at 15; Sacks, supra note 18, at 349; see MONES, supra note 19, at 15 (noting
that there are very few cases in which the parent was killed while beating or arguing with the child).
220. MOt'ms, supra note 19, at 15; see Chapin Wright, Straight A's; Guilty Verdict. NEWSDAY, Dec. 17,
1990, at 4 (reporting that Nicole Roberts, a girl who brutally slashed her abusive mother's throat, had discussed
ways of killing her mother with her sister, prior to the murder).
221. Morning Edition: Battered Child Syndrome Recognized as Self-Defense (NPR, June 22, 1993); see
Jana Mazanec, Murder or Victim? Town Rallies to Teen's Side, USA TODAY, Nov. 12, 1992, at 2A (specifying
that 95% of children who commit parricide face some form of homicide conviction).
222. MONES, supra note 19, at 15; David Margolick, When a Child Kills Parent, It's Sometimes to
Survive, N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 14, 1992, at D20.
223. In January 1994, the juries in People of the State of California v. Erik Galen Menendez & Joseph
Lyle Menendez, BA068880 (1990), considered the battered child defense when they deliberated two murders.
See infra notes 302-317 and accompanying text (discussing the Menendez brothers' trial).
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 26
defendant should be heard by the trier of fact. In order to more accurately specu-
late on California's treatment of the admissibility of a battered child defendant's
state of mind, it is helpful to evaluate cases from other states.
C. Cases
There is little precedent on the admissibility of evidence regarding a battered
child defendant's state of mind because only a few courts in the country have
addressed it. 4 Some courts have not decided this issue because of procedural
errors at trial.' Of the courts that have considered its admissibility, some have
decided to allow the evidence, while others have not. 1 6 Thus, the few states that
have addressed the issue have drawn different conclusions regarding the admis-
sibility of evidence substantiating an abused child's claim of self-defense?2 7
1. Wyoming
In Jahnke v. State,228 the defendant shot and killed his father several hours
after the two had a confrontation. 9 The defendant had a violent argument with
his father and later that evening his parents went out to dinner 30 During their
absence, the defendant changed into dark clothing, positioned numerous weapons
throughout the house, and hid in the garage in such a position that he could not
224. See infra notes 225-286 and accompanying text (discussing rulings from other states that decide
the issue of the battered child defense).
225. See infra notes 228-270 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of these courts' analyses).
226. See infra notes 271-286 and accompanying text (explaining the rationales of these courts'
decisions).
227. Some of the states that have addressed the issue are Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, New York,
Washington, and Wyoming. See infra notes 228-286 and accompanying text.
Additionally, in Oklahoma, two brothers were charged with the first degree murder of their abusive
father. Their attorney had planned to use the battered child defense to justify the slaying. However, the boys
pled no contest to the charge and were placed on probation for five years. Because this case involved juvenile
defendants, the files concerning the case are sealed; therefore, there is no case citation available. See Tony
Mauro, ChildAbuse Becoming a Defense Trend, USA TODAY, Sept. 24, 1993, at 2A (reporting that Lonnie
and Druie Dutton were going to use the battered child defense in their trial for the murder of their abusive
father); B.E. Stewart, The Dragonslayer, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1993, at F1 (describing the abusive story of
Lonnie and Druie Dutton); World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC television broadcast, Aug. 16,
1993) (reporting that the Dutton brothers were scheduled to stand trial for the first degree murder of their
abusive father); 48 Hours with Dan Rather (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 8, 1993) (describing the abuse the
Dutton brothers suffered and the support they received from their community after they killed their father); see
also Arnold Hamilton, Boys Plead No Contest in Dad's Slaying, DALLAS MORNING NEwS, Sept. 15,1993, at
IA (reporting that the brothers pled no contest to the reduced charge of first degree manslaughter, much to the
dismay of their friends and family); Sahagun, supra note 218, at A1 (describing the support the community
of Rush Springs, Oklahoma, gave the Dutton brothers after they killed their father).
228. 682 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1984).
229. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 995.
230. Id.
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be seen, but could see any activity on the driveway23 When his parents arrived
home, he opened fire on his father at the moment he could see his father's head
and shoulders. 2 On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court denied the defendant
the opportunity to present evidence pertaining to the battered child's state of mind
because the court determined that self-defense of any kind must be accompanied
by a threat of imminent bodily harmY3'
At trial, the defendant claimed that he had been a victim of his father's abuse
and argued that the court should consider his state of mind at the time of the
killing, as in cases of battered women.' The court disagreed and concluded that
the appropriate analysis for self-defense is an objective test.a5 Accordingly, the
court ruled that the jury could only look at the facts surrounding the killing, not
at the defendant's daily fear of his abusive fatherY The jury found him guilty of
first degree murder, apparently determining that the defendant's behavior was not
in accord with that of a reasonable person.
2. Washington
In State v. Janes,38 a seventeen-year-old-boy was convicted of second degree
murder after shooting his stepfather2 9 The defendant had been emotionally and
physically abused by his stepfather for many years.2 ° The defendant claimed that
because of the history of abuse, he was acting in self-defense when he shot his
stepfather.24'
At trial, the defendant proffered a child psychiatrist who was prepared to
testify that the defendant suffered from post traumatic stress disorder.242 The trial
judge, however, excluded the expert and denied the defendant's request for a self-
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See id. at 1006 (Wyo. 1984). Self-defense must include circumstances that involve a confrontation
which would induce a reasonable person to fear death or great bodily harm. Nunez v. State, 3 P.2d 726,727
(Wyo. 1965).
234. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 996. The defendant cited Burhle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981), in which
a wife claimed that she suffered from battered woman syndrome. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 996; see supra notes 126-
191 and accompanying text (discussing the battered woman syndrome).
235. Jahnke, 682 P.2d at 996-97.
236. Id. at 996.
237. Id. at 995. The reviewing court stated that the defendant had failed to make an adequate offer of
proof at trial as to the effect or pertinence of an expert witness' testimony and had failed to recall on appeal
a psychiatrist whose testimony had given the defense some prior difficulties. Id. at 1008. These two defense
errors precluded the supreme court from considering the merits of admitting state of mind evidence of the
battered child defendant.
238. 850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993).
239. Janes, 850 P.2d at 495.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 500.
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defense jury instruction.243 The Supreme Court of Washington reversed the trial
court's decision, becoming the first court to recognize the need to consider the
effects of abuse on a battered child defendant's state of mind.244 The standard
prescribed by the court to evaluate the need for self-defense was that of a "reason-
ably prudent person, knowing all the defendant knows and seeing all the defen-
dant sees." 245
The court further held that there is a two-part inquiry that the lower court
must use to determine the admissibility of evidence regarding a battered child's
state of mind: whether the evidence satisfies (1) the admissibility requirements
of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,246 and (2) the Frye test.2 47
3. Kansas
In State v. Crabtree,2 4' a seventeen-year-old male defendant was convicted
of second degree murder for killing his stepfather.2 49 The stepfather had physi-
cally, emotionally, and sexually abused the defendant and his siblings.' 0 On the
day of the homicide, the stepfather and the defendant had been involved in an
argument.25 After the killing, the defendant told the police that his stepfather had
made a threat to get a knife. 2 In response, the defendant had gone into his room,
retrieved a shotgun, and followed his stepfather out of the house. 253The defendant
then shot and killed his stepfather. 254
At trial, the defendant claimed that the killing occurred in self-defenseY25 He
argued that if the claim of self-defense creates a reasonable doubt as to his culp-
243. Id.
244. Id. at 501. The court recognized that battered children may be acting out of self-defense in
parricides. Morning Edition: Battered Child Syndrome Recognized as Self-Defense (NPR, June 22, 1993).
245. Janes, 850 P.2d at 504.
246. See FED. R. EvlD. § 702 (requiring that the subject of an expert witness' testimony be proven
reliable by an inference or assertion which was derived by scientific method and was shown to be relevant by
assisting the trier of fact in understanding the evidence).
247. Janes, 850 P.2d at 501. The Frye test is a rule by which the proposed scientific evidence is
considered for admission if the evidence is generally accepted in the particular field in which it belongs. Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). But see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113
S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (holding that the Frye test is not part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and that the Federal
Rules do not have a prerequisite of general acceptance in the scientific community before scientific evidence
can be admitted). Those states that do not follow the Federal Rules of Evidence do not necessarily have to
consider or comply with the Daubert holding. In addition, those states which have adopted the Federal Rules
of Evidence are not required to follow Daubert because its holding only specifically applies to federal courts.
248. 805 P.2d I (Kan. 1991).
249. Crabtree, 805 P.2d at 2.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 3.
252. Id.
253. Id. The defendant later admitted that he did not know if the decedent actually had a knife. Id.
254. Id. at 3-4.
255. Id. at 5.
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ability, he should be found not guilty.16 The court, however, did not give any
self-defense instruction that would allow the jury to consider his state of mind at
the time of the killing. s7 On appeal, the defendant maintained that he was entitled
to a self-defense instruction with the same language and justification as that used
in the case of a battered woman 8 The appellate court rejected this argument,
stating that there was no evidence warranting any form of imperfect self-defense
instruction.as 9 Thus, the court refused to consider the state of mind of the battered
child defendant, although it specified that its decision was not a broad-based
ruling but, rather, limited only to the circumstances of the case. 60
4. Louisiana
In State v. Gachot,'2' a fifteen-year-old defendant was convicted of murdering
both of his parents.' 2 The defendant argued that evidence of his state of mind at
the time of the killing should be admitted because it was essential to his de-
fense.263 He claimed that the verbal abuse that his father had inflicted upon him
had caused him to temporarily lose control and shoot both of his parents.2 4
At trial, the defendant attempted to use a psychologist to convince the jury
that he suffered from diminished capacity based on severe mental abuse.2 65 On
appeal, the defendant claimed that a Louisiana statute codified the battered child
defense by allowing the presentation of evidence as to the defendant's state of
mind at the time of the killing.266 The appellate court held that, although there
were changes in the evidence law, the changes only apply in cases in which a
defendant enters a plea alleging that he suffered from a mental condition at the
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1.
258. Id. at 5.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 5-6.
261. 609 So. 2d 269 (La. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 617 So. 2d 1180 (La. 1993).
262. Gachot, 609 So. 2d at 271.
263. Id. at 276.
264. Id. The defendant and his parents had been arguing when the defendant's father began to verbally
attack his son about his homosexuality; the defendant lost control as a result. Id.
265. Id.
266. See LA. CODE EViD. ANN. art. 404(a)(2) (West 1995) (providing in pertinent part "when a defendant
pleads self-defense and there is a history of assaultive behavior between the victim and the accused and the
accused lived in a familial ... relationship such as ... parent-child, ... it shall not be necessary to first show
a hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim in order to introduce evidence of the dangerous
character of the victim .... "); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 651 (West 1981) (specifying that when a
defendant is tried upon a plea of "not guilty," evidence of insanity or mental defect at the time of the offense
is inadmissible); Gachot, 609 So. 2d at 276 (explaining that the court refused to hear evidence that the
defendant had a perception that was different than that of a reasonable person, including a battered child
defense, because the defendant did not plead "not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity" per Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure article 651).
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time of the incident.26 Because the defendant had originally entered a plea of "not
guilty" and not the appropriate plea of "not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity," evidence of the defendant's mental abuse was inadmissible.2 68
According to the cited statute, evidence of assaultive behavior between the victim
and the accused is admissible only after the defendant enters the appropriate
plea.2  Therefore, this defendant was unable to present any evidence as to his
state of mind.27°
5. Florida
In 1989, a judge acquitted the defendant in State v. Goodykoontz27 of the
murder of her physically and sexually abusive father. 2 The judge found that the
defendant had a reasonable belief that she was in imminent danger, although there
was no actual threat of immediate physical action by her father.273 In addition, the
judge noted that the defendant's use of deadly force was reasonable to protect
herself from the impending harm.274
In the 1993 case of State v. Barnes,275 a Florida judge acquitted a sixteen-
year-old boy of shooting and killing his sleeping father.27 6 The defendant claimed
that his father had been abusive to him and to his mother.2 7 As well, on the night
of the killing, the father threatened the defendant with a knife, and had previously
threatened the defendant's mother in a similar manner.?78 The judge apparently
was convinced that the defendant had acted in self-defense, even though the father
was asleep when the defendant shot him.279
At the time of the killings, neither defendant in Goodykoontz or Barnes faced
an imminent threat of harm from the abuser. Yet, both defendants were allowed
to present evidence of their state of mind at the time of the killings and were ac-
quitted of murder. Based on the holdings in the aforementioned cases, it appears
267. Gachot, 609 So. 2d at 276.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 278.
271. Because this case involved a juvenile offender, the files concerning the case are sealed; therefore,
there is no case citation available. See Judge Acquits Girl Who Killed Abusive Dad, CHI. TRm., July 2, 1989,
at C24 (discussing the situation of Diana Goodykoontz).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Because this case involved ajuvenile offender, the files concerning the case are scaled; therefore,
there is no case citation available. See Karl Vick, Brothers' Murder Trial True California Tale, ST.
PETERSBuRG TiMES, Dec. 23,1993, at Al (explaining the details surrounding the killing of J.D. Barnes' father).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
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that the state of Florida recognizes an imperfect theory of self-defense in the case
of battered children.
6. New York
In People v. Cruickshank,' a teenage girl who had been sexually abused shot
her father as he walked away from their argument.2" She told him that he could
not enter the home or else he would be in violation of a separation agreement bet-
ween the girl's mother and father. 2 After he insisted on coming into the home,
the defendant shot him in the back and in the head. 83 She was convicted of first
degree manslaughter.2
The appellate court reversed her conviction based in part on the fact that she
was a sexually abused child and her crime directly arose from that condition.u5
On the day of the killing, the defendant feared that her father had entered the
home to sexually assault her. The court referred to the expert testimony which
had been offered at trial and determined that her extreme emotional disturbance
provided a reasonable explanation of her reaction. 
6
By allowing expert testimony of the fear that the defendant experienced at the
time of the killing and using that evidence as a basis for reversing the conviction,
it appears that the appellate court in New York has recognized that evidence of
the accused's state of mind is necessary to evaluate the culpability of a battered
child defendant.
V. CALIFORNIA'S ANTICIPATED TREATMENT OF ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE
STATE OF MIND OF A BATTERED CHILD
It would seem to be in the best interest of California and its battered child
defendants for its courts to consider the approaches taken by other states and io
develop a well-supported position on the question of whether to admit evidence
of the state of mind of such defendants. Because the evidence at issue is ana-
logous to that already allowed in the cases of battered women, it would also seem
prudent for California to evaluate its position on admitting state of mind evidence
of a battered woman defendant and consider the possible impact that allowing
280. 484 N.Y.S.2d 328 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
281. Cruickshank, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
282. Id. at 331-32.
283. Id. at 332.
284. Id. at 328.
285. Id. at 337.
286. Id.
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such evidence of any abused defendant may have on the state's criminal justice
system.' 7
A. Impact of Cases Involving Battered Woman Defendants
There have only been a few opportunities for California courts to consider
admitting evidence of a battered woman."s Without the broad foundation of
decisions that have involved analyses of the subjective fears of abused woman
defendants, California courts may be at a disadvantage when considering the sub-
jective fears of children in parricide cases.n 9 Following are two examples of
rulings that California courts have made regarding battered woman defendants
which may be beneficial in the State's consideration of admitting evidence of a
battered child.
In People v. Aris,290 the court of appeal articulated the applicability of
evidence of the battered woman syndrome in self-defense cases. The court noted
that imperfect self-defense requires the defender's subjectively honest belief that
deadly force is necessary. 9' Proof of this subjective belief negates the mental
element of malice that is required for homicide, which then reduces the crime to
manslaughter.29 The court also established criteria under which an expert's testi-
mony could be deemed relevant when discussing the battered woman syn-
drome.293 The most important consideration is the imminence of dandr.
Another related factor for the jury to consider is the reasonableness of the wo-
man's reaction to her abuser. To determine whether the defendant is in imminent
danger and her reaction is reasonable, the jury is permitted to consider the
defendant's subjective fears of the abuser.295
287. See C. EWING, BATrERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION 79 (1987) (speculating that battered children who are accused of parricide may be able to use
an extension of the battered woman defense as a psychological self-defense claim).
288. See supra notes 290-301 and accompanying text (discussing some California cases addressing the
admissibility of evidence of the state of mind of a battered woman defendant).
289. See Sacks, supra note 18, at 379 (explaining that the psychological effects of battered children are
similar to those present in battered women and therefore provide a foundation upon which to extend the
battered woman defense); cf. Tx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.36(b)(1) (Vernon 1995) (providing the
nation's first statute which allows evidence of family violence to be admitted when an abused woman or child
kills).
290. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178,264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1989).
291. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1186,264 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1197, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 180; see James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Admissibility of Expert
or Opinion Testimony on Battered Wife or Battered Woman Syndrome, 18 A.L.R. 4th 1153, 1154 (1993 &
Supp. 1994) (discussing Aris as a case in which the court has decided under what circumstances expert
testimony concerning the state of mind of a battered woman defendant is admissible in evidence).
294. Ads, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1193-99,264 Cal. Rptr. at 177-81.
295. Id. at 1189,264 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
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In People v. Day,29 the appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction
of involuntary manslaughter.2 97 The court stated that the woman, who showed
signs of physical and emotional abuse, should have been given the opportunity
to present evidence and offer testimony about the battered woman syndrome.298
The court acknowledged that evidence of the battered woman syndrome would
have lent credence to the woman's defense.29 Without the benefit of such testi-
mony, the defendant was ineffectively represented.3 ° Accordingly, the court held
that the defense counsel's failure to present accurate evidence of the battered
woman syndrome was unfairly prejudicial because it did not let the jury consider
the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the killing?01
By allowing expert testimony regarding the state of mind of an abused
woman defendant, jurors are given the opportunity to evaluate the circumstances
of the killing from the perspective of the abuse victim in order to determine
whether her lethal reaction was reasonable. Although imminence is a necessary
element in traditional self-defense analysis, in the case of a battered woman, the
imminence must be evaluated from the perspective of the abused woman. Expert
testimony is essential to understand the abused woman's perception of imminence
in the situation. Evidence of the woman's perceived imminence of the danger will
also provide the trier of fact with a foundation upon which the psychological im-
pact of abuse can be considered. In cases of abused children, evidence of the
child's state of mind, through expert or lay witness testimony, can also be illus-
trative of the child's perception of imminence and the reasonableness of the
killing.
B. California's Recent Consideration of Admitting Evidence of the State of
Mind of a Battered Child Defendant
The most publicized case in which California juries were able to consider the
state of mind of battered children was in the murder trial of J. Lyle and Erik
Menendez.' 2 In People v. E. Menendez & J. Menendez,303 the two brothers were
charged with the first degree murders of their parents. 3' The brothers attempted
296. 2 Cal. App. 4th 405,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (1992).
297. Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 407, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 917.
298. Id. at 419, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925.
299. Id. at 420,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 419, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 925.
302. The murder trial of J. Lyle and Erik Menendez began in May, 1993 and ended in a mistrial in
January, 1994.
303. People of the State of California v. Erik Galen Menendez & Joseph Lyle Menendez, BA068880
(1990).
304. Id.
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to justify their actions by claiming that years of physical, emotional, and sexual
abuse from their parents caused them to fear for their lives.
305
During the trial, the defense attorneys presented several expert witnesses who
testified about the psychological make-up of physically and sexually abused
children in order to establish that the brothers had suffered the same psycho-
logical trauma as other abused children.3 6 Essentially, the expert witnesses set
forth the Menendez brothers' defense.307 They testified that children who are
physically and sexually abused on a continuous basis can see no alternative to
leaving the abusive situation.308 Therefore, the experts inferred that at the time of
the incident the brothers feared for their lives.0 9
Battered children who commit parricide generally claim their actions were in
self-defense.310 Self-defense is generally defined as a reaction to an honest and
reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury.31 This is known as "perfect" self-
defense. However, there is also "imperfect" self-defense, which consists of an
honest but unreasonable belief of fear of death or great bodily injury.3 12 In the
Menendez trial, the judge instructed the juries that they could find that the
defendants used imperfect self-defense. 31 3 He explained imperfect self-defense as
the defendant's genuine belief of a threat to his life, although there was none pres-
ent.314 Dr. Ann Burgess"'5 a professor of psychiatric nursing and an expert
305. Vick, supra note 275, at Al; see Phil Reeves, Menendez Brothers' Trial Hinges on Tape, THE
INDEPENDENT, Nov. 23, 1993, at 11 (relating that the brothers denied their involvement in the murders until
ajudge decided that an incriminating tape recorded during a psychological therapy session could be admitted
as evidence in the trial); see also Alan Abrahamson, Last of 56 Witnesses Says That Although the Brothers Told
Their Therapist of Murdering Their Parents, They Did Not Trust Him Enough to Disclose Details of Abuse,
L.A. TImEs, Nov. 19, 1993, at BI (clarifying that the judge allowed the tape into evidence because the
defendants had placed their mental stability as a central issue in the trial, and, therefore, the tape between the
defendants and their therapist was relevant evidence).
306. See infra notes 307-309. 315-317 and accompanying text (discussing the expert witness testimony
presented in the Menendez case).
307. Vick, supra note 275, at Al.
308. Id.; see Hicks, supra note 197, at 119 (explaining that the lack of a viable escape combined with
continuous and consistent patterns of abuse may cause a battered child to strike back against the abuser).
309. Vick, supra note 275, at Al.
310. Scobey, supra note 3, at 181-82.
311. CAL. PENAL CODE § 197 (West 1988); see supra notes 26-93 and accompanying text (discussing
self-defense).
312. See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text (discussing the imperfect theory of self-defense in
which the mental element of malice can be eliminated and the defendant can only be found guilty of
manslaughter); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 192 (West Supp. 1994) (defining manslaughter as an unlawful
killing, without malice, of another human being).
313. Vick, supra note 275, at Al.
314. Id.
315. See Is-a Constitutional Amendment Necessary to Protect our Children? Children's Advocates to
Sponsor FRE, PR Newswire, Nov. 30, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnews File (listing Dr.
Burgess' qualifications as a child advocate; an expert in the areas of victimology, child sexual abuse, and post
traumatic disorders; a former member of the U.S. Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence; an
author, and a recipient of many professional awards).
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witness in the Menendez trial, testified that the brothers may have interpreted a
statement by their mother as an indication that the parents were plotting to kill the
defendants.1 6 She further testified that although the brothers were eighteen and
twenty-one years of age at the time of the murders, the extensive abuse they
experienced throughout childhood may have caused them to have a difficult time
in establishing their independence from their parents, which, in turn, may have
prevented them from leaving the threatening situation.3 7
C. The Imperfect Self-Defense Theory
Evidence regarding a defendant's state of mind is admissible when the jury
is considering a theory of imperfect self-defense because the propriety of the
defendant's conduct is evaluated from the defendant's standpoint, not from that
of a reasonable person.318 As demonstrated in the Menendez trial, California cur-
rently allows defendants to plead a theory of imperfect self-defense.3 9
Proponents of the defense argue that battered children have a unique psycho-
logical makeup that causes them to see killing their parents as their only alter-
native to ending the abuse.32 Unfortunately, because courts do not consider con-
tinuous abuse an immediate and obvious threat to a child's life, the courts reject
this theory of defense because the circumstances of parricide do not conform to
the traditional self-defense theory.32' Advocates further stress that courts must
begin to recognize that in an abusive relationship, the danger is subtle and
realized only by the abused child.3
As shown, the central tenet of the imperfect self-defense argued by battered
women and battered children is the subjective fear of the defendant at the time of
the killing. Without expert testimony regarding the psychological effects of abuse,
juries may be unable to adequately assess the defendant's state of mind. Courts
should admit expert testimony in the cases of parricide defendants in order to
allow the jury to consider all relevant information including the subjective fear
of the child defendant. az
316. Vick, supra note 275, at Al; see supra notes 306-309 and accompanying text (discussing the
Menendez case).
317. Vick, supra note 275, at Al; cf. supra notes 123-130, 156-159 and accompanying text (discussing
the emotional bond between battered women and their abusers).
318. Scobey, supra note 3, at 183.
319. See supra notes 305-317 and accompanying text (discussing the Menendez brothers' defense).
320. Sacks, supra note 18, at 349.
321. Id.; see Scobey, supra note 3, at 186 (explaining that the traditional views of self-defense do not
consider the psychological circumstances of the child).
322. Mavis J. Van Sambeek, Parricide as Self-Defense, 7 LAW & INEQUALITY J. 87, 90-91 (1988).
323. See Sacks, supra note 18, at 360 n.77 (arguing that using a subjective standard to evaluate the
culpability of a parricide defendant is preferred because such a standard would require the consideration of the
history of abuse and characteristics of the battered child).
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D. Ramifications
There are several consequences that may follow a California court's decision
to give defendants the opportunity to present evidence of child abuse. Some of
these ramifications will affect the child directly, while others will impact the
judicial and child protective systems.
1. Advantages to Admitting Evidence of the State of Mind of a Battered
Child Defendant
In some sense, the admissibility of such evidence may provide abused
children with an opportunity to escape the entrapment of a violent world. Some
children may have considered leaving home to escape the abuse, but were too
fearful that their abuser would harm other family members due to their absence. 324
In addition, some children may be unable to leave the home due to limited
financial resources, education, or skills. Instead of leaving the situation, battered
children, some of whom do not realize that abuse is not normal325 nor know of
resources to which they can turn for help, 3 26 may opt to defend against the abusive
parent to save their own and their loved ones' lives? 27 In many cases, abused
children are at a physical disadvantage to their parents during a confrontation, and
the size discrepancy often leads the children to submit to the abuse and retaliate
later.328
In addition to the fear of further abuse, many children are threatened with
death or serious injury to themselves or another member of the family if they
reveal the abuse.329 In order to prevent the threatened retaliation, abused children
324. See MONES, supra note 19, at 45 (noting that most teenagers continue to feel helpless due to the
threats made against other members of their family).
325. Id. at 42; see Joelle A. Moreno, Killing Daddy: Developing a Self-Defense Strategy for the Abused
Child, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1300 (1989) (mentioning that children in violent families usually do not realize
that abuse is wrong).
326. Kathleen M. Heide, Why Kids Kill Parents, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 1992, at 64; see Sacks,
supra note 18. at 357 n.56 (arguing that the problems of abused children are compounded by a lack of
intervention by outside sources).
327. See MONES, supra note 19, at 37 (explaining that there are psychological reasons why children who
commit parricide rarely seek help for the abuse). One reason is that children bond with their primary caregiver.
Id. The attachment to the primary caregiver is a natural example of a survival mechanism which all children
develop. Id. at 38 (citing Bessel Van der Kolk, a Harvard Medical School psychiatrist). Abused children also
develop this bond, although it is made with the fear of being abandoned. Id. (citing Van der Kolk).
328. Scobey, supra note 3, at 186; see Sacks, supra note 18, at 349 (explaining that abused children
believe that killing their parents is the only effective means to end the abuse).
329. MONES, supra note 19, at 41; see Jahnke v. State, 682 P.2d 991, 1022 (Vyo. 1984) (Cardine, J.,
dissenting) (noting that one of the reasons the defendant set forth for returning home was the fear that his father
would injure his mother and sister in retaliation for his departure).
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often learn to adapt to their environment.3 ° Frequently, these children train them-
selves to mentally leave the abusive setting.33 t If the child is a teenager, a physical
departure may also be a viable alternative.332 Once again, however, the abuser
may have threatened to harm another family member if the child runs away.33 It
is possible that allowing evidence that the defendant is an abused child could
allow children who act in self-defense to put their abusive pasts behind them and
attempt to lead productive lives, rather than be confined in prison. In allowing a
child to protect himself or his family, the admissibility of the child's state of mind
to support a claim of imperfect self-defense may be an important weapon in
beginning to repair the damage of child abuse by eliminating the source of the
pain.
This rationale is similar to that presented by battered woman defendants
which has already been adopted by many states through evidence of a battered
woman's state of mind. Experts who have testified on behalf of abused women
have explained that these women are psychologically trapped in their relation-
ships. These experts have provided needed insight regarding a woman defen-
dant's fear of her abuser. It appears that the experts have been successful in con-
veying to the jury a woman's state of mind at the time of the killing. Court recog-
nition and consideration of the psychological effects of abuse saves battered
women who killed their abusers from suffering the additional harm associated
with a murder conviction. Although not all abused women are acquitted, many
are convicted of a reduced charge of manslaughter which provides for probation
or a reduced term of incarceration. The evidence which is presented to support the
battered woman syndrome focuses on the subjective fear victims have of their
abusers. Similar evidence can be illustrative of a battered child.
330. MoNEs, supra note 19. at 41; see Peter Arenella, Perspective on Abuse; Are Kids Who Lash Back
Culpable?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1993, at B7 (stating that when given the choice of killing the parent or
submitting to further abuse, most children remain in the home and submit); Van Sambeek, supra note 322, at
104 (describing the "concentration camp" mentality, in which abused children succumb to the notion that they
have no alternatives and must remain in the home); see also Hicks, supra note 197, at 103 (reciting that
battered children live in a severely violent environment in which the abuse often occurs frequently and without
warning).
331. See Mot m, supra note 19, at 42 (providing examples of abusive situations in which a child may
mentally remove himself from the situation). For instance, a fifteen-year-old boy who stabbed his father to
death explained that during episodes of sexual abuse, he would let his mind wander and "just go away" so he
would not have any emotional feelings. Id.
332. See Judge Acquits Girl Rho Killed Abusive Dad, supra note 271, at C24 (reporting that the
defendant's testimony indicated that she considered leaving the home through the bedroom window, but felt
that curtains and other obstacles would prevent it).
333. See MONES, supra note 19, at 46 (explaining that children often refrain from running away because
they are afraid of (1) retaliation by the abuser against their family or against themselves if they are caught, or
(2) the uncertainty of what may happen to them without the economic security of their parents); see also Heide,
supra note 326, at 63 (explaining that survival on the streets is unrealistic for many children because of their
lack of finances, limited education, and limited skills); cf supra note 146 and accompanying text (discussing
the reasons why battered women do not leave their abusers and deeming economic insecurity to be a relevant
factor).
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Allowing evidence regarding the state of mind of an abused child defendant
in a parricide case will provide the trier of fact with essential information sur-
rounding the circumstances of the killing. Without this information, the trier of
fact will not be able to adequately assess the culpability of the child defendant.
Furthermore, denying such evidence will serve as an injustice to the defendant
because the child will probably not meet the traditional elements of self-defense,
and will therefore be convicted of a more serious degree of murder.
Although there may be a few positive effects from a decision to admit expert
testimony of the state of mind of child parricide defendants, the majority of the
effects will probably be negative. The negative impact of the decision will
probably be most strongly felt by the state's judicial and social service systems,
and possibly by the children themselves.
2. Disadvantages to Admitting Evidence of the State of Mind of a
Battered Child Defendant
Admitting evidence of the state of mind of a battered child would have a
significant negative impact in many areas of society. First, the judicial system
would be affected by the new focus on self-defense. Second, the social service
system, which is designed to intervene and assist in abusive situations, may find
that the focus of its counseling services will shift from counseling abuse victims
to counseling parricide offenders. Finally, the impact of the defense could
ultimately have a devastating impact on a child who kills an abusive parent. The
child will not be totally free from the parent; rather, the child will need to over-
come the reality that the parent is dead by the child's own hand.
a. Impact on the Judicial System
One of the primary impacts that such evidence would have on the judicial
system is the realization of a new standard by which to assess the culpability of
the child defendant. No longer would the justice system be evaluating the actions
of some children using a purely objective standard. Instead, the courts would be
faced with issues regarding the applicability of the imperfect self-defense theory
in the case of a battered child. Courts throughout the country, including Cali-
fornia, have already addressed similar concerns as applied to battered woman
defendants. Many states evaluate the state of mind of a battered woman by
allowing and considering expert testimony relating to the psychological dynamics
of continuous abuse. Because of the similarity of the effects of abuse on abused
women and children, there is no foreseeable problem with applying the battered
woman subjective standard to abused child defendants.
Imparting the message that the courts are condoning the behavior of children
who kill their parents may have an additional detrimental impact on the criminal
justice system. Currently, even without the consideration of the state of mind of
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a battered child, the number of violent crimes committed by youth throughout
California has continued to increase? 4 It is possible that if the evidence is
allowed, children who become angry with their parents may kill them, with the
intention of claiming that they were abused?35 Although it may be difficult for
these children to successfully fabricate stories of abuse, the current societal norm
dictates that adults subscribe to the truth of the allegations made by children and
ask questions later.
b. Impact on the Social Service System
In addition to the effects on the criminal justice system, the impact of the
defense may also be felt in the state's social service system. Because child abuse
has recently become more recognized, numerous resources have become readily
accessible to abused children. For example, counselors, teachers, and other
professionals who deal with children are legally obligated to report to the police
any potential symptoms of abuse.336 These signs may include the child's physical
appearance, behavior or words 37 Based on the results of an investigation of
abuse, a child protective services agency may be requested to evaluate the situ-
ation of a particular child. The agency representative may recommend counseling
for the family, or in a severe case, may recommend the removal of the child from
the household.
Another important consideration regarding the admission of battered child
evidence, however, is the serious implications which ordinarily follow a decision
of this magnitude. Abused children are in effect being given a lethal alternative
334. See End Violent Video Games, Lungren Asks Makers, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1993, at A25 (quoting
California Attorney General Dan Lungren as saying that there has been a 135% increase in state juvenile
murder arrests between 1986 and 1991). The comparable increase in national statistics has been 119%. Id.; see
also Mareva Brown, When Kids Molest Kids, State's Justice System Stumbles, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 31,
1993, at Al (reporting that between 1987 and 1992, there was an 18.5% increase in the number of juveniles
under 15 who were arrested for sexual charges).
Although gangs are the main reason behind the rise in juvenile crime, experts in criminal justice also cite
societal factors, including child abuse, as causing the increase. Miles Corwin, Increase in Youth Crime Brings
Push for Tougher Laws, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1993, at A3.
335. See Mauro, supra note 227, at 2A (acknowledging that some experts are concerned that defense
lawyers will argue this compelling defense although it may be a false excuse). Adolescents can and do make
exaggerated claims of abuse. Id. (quoting University of Virginia clinical psychologist Dewey Cornell); see
Barbara Yost, Battered Child Defense Abused in Beverly Hills Murder Case, PHOENIX GAZETE, Oct. 1, 1993,
at A13 (theorizing that the Menendez brothers killed their parents out of greed and, after confessing, contrived
stories of abuse); see also Mauro, supra note 227, at 2A (quoting attorney Paul Mones as saying that jurors
and judges can detect false reports of abuse).
336. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West Supp. 1995) (providing the statutory requirements for
reporting suspected child abuse); see also MONES, supra note 19, at 45 (stating that 1.5 million child abuse
reports are filed nationally each year). Some are reported by the abused children, but the majority are from
teachers, doctors, friends, and neighbors. Id.
337. See CAL PENAL CODE §§ 11165.1-11165.6 (West Supp. 1995) (setting forth the forms of abuse for
which a statutory reporter must watch).
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to handling a difficult and emotional situation. Once again, it would be beneficial
for the children to explore the social service programs in order to curtail any
potential problems.338 Among the examples are the numerous social service pro-
grams that are intended to benefit abused children. These incltde child abuse hot-
lines, abused victim shelters, and various counseling services.339 These programs
were developed as preventative measures with the purpose of assisting abused
children and their parents in dealing with and eventually ending the perpetual
cycle of violence. These resources must be publicized so that children and their
parents can take advantage of them before resorting to any form of violent be-
havior. To ignore the efforts of any of these resources while condoning further
domestic violence would not benefit abused children nor their abusive parents. 34
If California allows evidence of the child's state of mind, such agencies may have
to change their focus from counseling abuse victims to counseling parricide
offenders or those who are considering parricide.
c. Impact on the Abused Child
Although it may appear that the defense would be a viable alternative to a
child suffering from abuse, there is little evidence that the defense would have a
lasting benefit for the child?' For example, children do not have the mental
capabilities with which to accurately evaluate the severity of their individual cir-
338. See infra notes 339-340 and accompanying text (discussing alternative means to escapa child
abuse).
339. See. e.g., PACIFIC BELL WHITE PAGES, Government Listings 2 (1995) (naming the appropriate
branch of government to which one may report child abuse). Abuse may be reported to the city police, County
Child Protective Services, Health and Human Services, or the Social Services Department. Id.; see also Id.
Customer Guide, Emergency Crisis Hotlines A2 (1995) (listing a 24-hour service for abducted, abused, and
exploited children as (800) 248-8020); cf. id. (listing the 24-hour crisis phone number for Women Escaping
A Violent Environment (WEAVE), an organization which counsels abused women, attempts to help them
improve their relationships and also provides abused women with alternative solutions to remaining in the
abusive situations). But see Scobey, supra note 3, at 188 (providing that abused children are often disappointed
in their attempts to find relief from abuse with relatives, police, and social welfare agencies); Jahnke v. State,
682 P.2d 991, 1022 (Wyo. 1984) (providing an example of an abused boy who sought help from his ROTC
instructor and the sheriff's department). In Jahnke, the detective at the sheriff's department took pictures of
Jahnke's bruises and told him that since the foster homes were full, he had the choice of going home or staying
in jail. Alan Prendergast, It's You or Me, Dad, ROLLING STONE, May 26, 1983, at 41, 44.
340. See Corwin, supra note 334, at A3 (quoting Barry Krisberg, president of the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, as saying that legislatures are ignoring the cause of the crime problem-children who
are abused and neglected). The rise in youth crime is prompting many states to review their juvenile justice
systems. Id. But see Diana J. Ensign, Links Between the Battered Woman Syndrome and the Battered Child
Syndrome: An Argument for Consistent Standards in the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Family Abuse
Cases, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1619, 1625 (1990) (remarking that police intervention is not encouraged in all
domestic abuse cases).
341. See MONES, supra note 19, at 43. This issue extends into an extremely new area of research. All
children have different reactions to abuse. To evaluate its long-term impact on a particular child, consideration
of various factors are necessary. Id. These factors include the nature, duration, and gravity of the abuse. Id.
876
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cumstances?42 To illustrate, parents use different methods of punishment. Some
physically spank their child. Others restrict the activities in which their child may
participate. There are a few parents who seemingly never discipline their children.
If the children who are subjected to each of these methods compare the types of
punishment they receive, the spanked child may interpret his punishment as
abuse. In situations such as this one, a child may misinterpret discipline as abuse
and feel that he has "permission" to kill his parent in self-defense. As the child
grows older, however, and realizes that there is a difference between discipline
and abuse, he still contends with the fact that he killed a parent who was merely
attempting to discipline his or her child, not abuse him. Even before this
realization, the child will have to accept the fact that he killed someone.
Many of the concerns expressed above have been addressed by those who
counsel abused women and abused woman defendants. The woman may realize
that she killed her abuser, who was also her life partner. This man may also have
been the father of her children, and her children are now without that parent. In
addition, if the woman is incarcerated, the children are left with no parental
support. Though these considerations may appear inconsequential as compared
to the continuous abuse, the reaction an abused woman has to the killing is
shocking? 43 By considering the effects that the killing has on the battered woman,
experts and psychologists may be better able to assist an abused child through a
potentially difficult period following the abuse.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it seems that it would be unwise to permit the youth
of California to continue the pattern of violence by providing them with a deadly
excuse to remedy a possible error in judgment. Not only are there resources
intended to help children escape an abusive environment, but also to confront and
help their abusers.
The most recently publicized California case that has presented evidence of
the state of mind of a battered child is the trial of two adult brothers. 344 This pro-
ceeding ended in a mistrial. Based on this result, it is difficult to speculate on
California's treatment of the battered child evidence. It is possible, however, to
342. Id. at 37-43; see Sacks, supra note 18, at 360 n.80 (explaining that some opponents to the battered
child defense argue that children are not in fear of abuse at all times; therefore, there is no imminence to the
children's abusive situation and it would be too speculative to conclude that children would react only at a time
of imminent peril); Mark Hansen, Battered Child's Defense: Youths Who Killed Relatives Offer Evidence of
Abuse With Mixed Results, 78 A.B.A.J. 28, May 1992 (observing that in a homicide case involving a battered
defendant, the defense attempts to show how the abusive relationship can affect the battered defendant's
perceptions of what constitutes an imminent threat).
343. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing some examples of the reactions that battered
woman defendants exhibit after the killing).
344. See supra notes 302-317 and accompanying text (discussing the Menendez case).
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assume that twenty-four jurors could not agree on the facts of this case, including
the potential effect the abuse had on the brothers. Such a result seems to
accurately parallel the attitude toward imperfect self-defense in California.
Currently, it seems that the California Supreme Court recognizes that a person
may act in self-defense if the person had an honest but unreasonable belief of
imminent harm. 5 However, the result of the upcoming Menendez trial could be
important to determine whether evidence regarding the effects of abuse on a
child's honest and reasonable belief of imminent danger will be admitted and
accepted by a jury.
Due to the unique facts of the Menendez case, it appears that other children
who seek to introduce battered child evidence could easily distinguish their cases
from the Menendez situation. This distinction can be partially based on the fact
that the Menendez case examined the culpability of two adults who killed their
parents. In addition, this case presents no evidence that the parents presented a
threat of imminent harm to the brothers. Although the defendants claim that they
feared for their lives, without any evidence of any type of threat, it does not
appear that the brothers will be successful in their claim of self-defense. The de-
fense can probably be refuted because the testimony of abuse will only support
the mental element of the killings. The brothers still must establish the traditional
elements of self-defense.3 6 This case serves as an insufficient precedent for an
abused juvenile who commits parricide and attempts to justify it through im-
perfect self-defense.
There is a possibility, however, for the courts to implement some safeguards
to prevent the abuse of such a defense. For example, the majority of other states
that have considered the issue of admitting battered child evidence has permitted
expert witness testimony regarding the psychological behavior of abused chil-
dren. 7 It is to the defendant's advantage to have an expert verify and explain the
source of the child's violent act, but it is possible that a child who has created the
story of abuse may not use one as By requiring expert testimony, the court can
reduce the effectiveness of this defense in the case of a child who falsely claims
abuse.
Currently, there are statutory and policy provisions which address the issues
of abused children. As reflected by the mandatory reporting statutes, the Cali-
fornia Legislature has intended to ensure that children do not have to make a
345. In re Christian, 7 Cal. 4th 768, 771, 872 P.2d 574, 575, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 34 (1994).
346. See Van Sambeek, supra note 322, at 105.
347. See supra notes 315-317 and accompanying text (discussing the use of expert witness testimony
in regard to battered child defendants); see also Sacks, supra note 18, at 350-51 (specifying that expert testi-
mony imparts to ajury critical information about battered children in order to assist it in making an informed
decision regarding the reasonableness of the child's actions). Without the expert testimony, a jury cannot pro-
perly evaluate the state of mind of a battered child defense claim. Id. at 351.
348. See Sacks, supra note 18, at 363 (speculating that jurors who believe that a child had a less drastic
option may not understand why the child resorted to killing the parent to end the abuse).
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determination that they themselves have been abused? 49 Unfortunately, these
statutes are not infallible. There may be instances in which a child is abused and
this condition goes unreported. There are, however, social service agencies, like
child protective services, which are intended to intervene and counsel in child
abuse situations. However, there may be a situation in which a child protective
services agent is sent to investigate a suspected abusive household and does not
discover any abuse. Under these circumstances, an abused child may resort to
another means of escape, which may include parricide.
Proponents argue that a battered child defense should be adopted in order to
address the needs of abused children, though they emphasize that the defense will
not serve as a license for a child to go on a killing rampage. 350 Because the issue
regarding the admissibility of evidence of the state of mind of abused child
defendants has arisen, it is possible that some legislation may arise in California
to codify it. Further, in order to achieve consistency within the jurisdictions, it is
possible that the ALI may amend the MPC to include a guidelines provision
which could be implemented when the state of mind of an abused child defendant
is at issue.
However, it is important to note that an imperfect self-defense does not lead
to an automatic acquittal35' Because the child defendant will still have to prove
the traditional elements of self-defense, the only benefit the child will realize from
the defense is the subjective consideration of his or her state of mind at the time
of the killings.352 With imperfect self-defense as an option, a jury is given more
options to match actions to moral culpability. The relevant state of mind for the
jury to consider is that of an abused child in the same circumstances as the child
defendant. Through the presence of mandatory reporting statutes and social
service agencies, abusive parents can be recognized and prosecuted through the
judicial system, and children do not need to feel that they must resort to violently
ending the abuse themselves.
349. See CAL PENALCODE § 11166 (West Supp. 1995). The reporter of child abuse is immunized from
criminal liability if the report is found to be meritless. Id. at § 11172 (West Supp. 1995). This immunity is
intended to encourage reports of suspicious signs, even if there is no certainty of abuse. Id.
350. Van Sambeek, supra note 322, at 104-06; see Kit Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-
Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REv. 393,459 n.294 (1988) (recognizing this potential criticism); Moreno, supra
note 325, at 1287 n.32 (arguing that a self-defense claim based on the dynamics of family violence is not a
request for special treatment, but a request for equal and individualized treatment). But see Cox, supra note
98, at Al (referring to comments made by attorney Alan Dershowitz who considers defendants which argued
that the only way to preserve their lives was to kill their abusers have insulted all the children who overcame
hellish childhoods without becoming violent and all battered wives who leave their abusers).
351. See Cox, supra note 98, at Al (providing an estimation by attorney Paul Mones that 97% of
parricide cases end in manslaughter convictions, and he only knows of three outright acquittals).
352. See Mauro, supra note 227, at 2A (quoting attorney Paul Mones as saying that just because a child
is abused does not give that child the right to kill, but that the child has the right to present evidence of abuse).

